Epistemic logic programs (ELPs), extend answer set programming (ASP) with epistemic operators. The semantics of such programs is provided in terms of world views, which are sets of belief sets, that is, syntactically, sets of sets of atoms. Different semantic approaches propose different characterizations of world views. Recent work has introduced semantic properties that should be met by any semantics for ELPs, like the Epistemic Splitting Property, that, if satisfied, allows to modularly compute world views in a bottom-up fashion, analogously to “traditional” ASP. We analyze the possibility of changing the perspective, shifting from a bottom-up to a top-down approach to splitting. We propose a basic top-down approach, which we prove to be equivalent to the bottom-up one. We then propose an extended approach, where our new definition: (i) is provably applicable to many of the existing semantics; (ii) operates similarly to “traditional” ASP; (iii) provably coincides under any semantics with the bottom-up notion of splitting at least on the class of Epistemically Stratified Programs (which are, intuitively, those where the use of epistemic operators is stratified); (iv) better adheres to common ASP programming methodology.

The language of epistemic specifications and epistemic logic programs extends disjunctive logic programs under the stable model semantics with modal constructs called subjective literals. Using subjective literals, it is possible to check whether a regular literal is true in every or some stable models of the program, those models, in this context also called belief sets, being collected in a set called world view. This allows for representing, within the language, whether some proposition should be understood accordingly to the open or the closed world assumption. Several attempts for capturing the intuitions underlying the language by means of a formal semantics were given, resulting in a multitude of proposals that makes it difficult to understand the current state of the art. In this article, we provide an overview of the inception of the field and the knowledge representation and reasoning tasks it is suitable for. We also provide a detailed analysis of properties of proposed semantics, and an outlook of challenges to be tackled by future research in the area.

We describe eclingo, a solver for epistemic logic programs under Gelfond 1991 semantics built upon the Answer Set Programming system clingo. The input language of eclingo uses the syntax extension capabilities of clingo to define subjective literals that, as usual in epistemic logic programs, allow for checking the truth of a regular literal in all or in some of the answer sets of a program. The eclingo solving process follows a guess and check strategy. It first generates potential truth values for subjective literals and, in a second step, it checks the obtained result with respect to the cautious and brave consequences of the program. This process is implemented using the multi-shot functionalities of clingo. We have also implemented some optimisations, aiming at reducing the search space and, therefore, increasing eclingo ’s efficiency in some scenarios. Finally, we compare the efficiency of eclingo with two state-of-the-art solvers for epistemic logic programs on a pair of benchmark scenarios and show that eclingo generally outperforms their obtained results.

In a recent line of research, two familiar concepts from logic programming semantics (unfounded sets and splitting) were extrapolated to the case of epistemic logic programs. The property of epistemic splitting provides a natural and modular way to understand programs without epistemic cycles but, surprisingly, was only fulfilled by Gelfond’s original semantics (G91), among the many proposals in the literature. On the other hand, G91 may suffer from a kind of self-supported, unfounded derivations when epistemic cycles come into play. Recently, the absence of these derivations was also formalised as a property of epistemic semantics called foundedness. Moreover, a first semantics proved to satisfy foundedness was also proposed, the so-called Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL). In this paper, we prove that FAEEL also satisfies the epistemic splitting property something that, together with foundedness, was not fulfilled by any other approach up to date. To prove this result, we provide an alternative characterisation of FAEEL as a combination of G91 with a simpler logic we called Founded Epistemic Equilibrium Logic (FEEL), which is somehow an extrapolation of the stable model semantics to the modal logic S5.

In this paper we consider Epistemic Logic Programs, which extend Answer Set Programming (ASP) with “ epistemic operators” and “ epistemic negation”, and a recent approach to the semantics of such programs in terms of World Views. We propose some observations on the existence and number of world views. We show how to exploit an extended ASP semantics in order to: (i) provide a characterization of world views, different from existing ones; (ii) query world views and query the whole set of world views.

We introduce [Ascr ]k, an extension of the action description language [Ascr ] (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1993) to handle actions which affect knowledge. We use sensing actions to increase an agent's knowledge of the world and non-deterministic actions to remove knowledge. We include complex plans involving conditionals and loops in our query language for hypothetical reasoning. We also present a translation of [Ascr ]k domain descriptions into epistemic logic programs.This paper extends the results of the work first presented in Lobo et al. (1997).