While divestments and decisions to exit commercial fossil fuel ventures are not new, the imperatives of the energy transition are catalysing such moves at a global industry-wide level, as oil companies position themselves for the future. The international normative framework for business and human rights provides clear guidance on how responsible divestment from fossil fuels should occur; however, in the absence of intergovernmental coordination and regulation, individual business divestment decisions create severe human rights risks. The case of Shell’s divestment from onshore Niger Delta oil production illustrates business and human rights issues relevant to the energy transition.

Offshore wind farms (OWF) are now in operation and increasingly under construction as scalable, sustainable energy sources. In fact OWFs are currently the cheapest form of new energy projects in Europe. The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for OWF has fallen drastically due to decades of innovation facilitated by both taxpayer and private sector funding. This emerging industry is experiencing massive worldwide growth with the potential to accelerate the decarbonization of regional and the global economy as well as bring a reliable source of green hydrogen into commercial use, all with minimal disruption to ecosystems and impacts on biodiversity. This paper provides a historical perspective of wind energy harnessing and shows that wind turbines are the oldest, largest and one of the smartest machines. We also highlight the potential of offshore wind energy to provide new solutions to (a) meet clean energy demand for a growing world population, (b) improve energy security of nations through other downstream technologies such as production and storage of dispatchable fuel (such as green hydrogen battery storage) and (c) through supply complementarity improve resilience of nuclear power plants in high-seismic-activity areas. Offshore wind industry can also become a gold standard for future industries, and the paper provides insights into the new green economics and jobs and factories for the future. We show that environment-friendly regulation is driving innovations even further to enhance sustainability of OWF. Examples include material recycling, landfill ban on blade disposal and ecofriendly low-noise offshore construction to protect biodiversity.

Confronting the coming five decades from our present conjuncture demands – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci’s famous mantra – both critical pessimism and a wilful politics of hope. In this article, we engage with the politics of climate breakdown and the responses to wider socio-ecological crises with a necessary critical pessimism. Specifically, we confront the capture of green transition imperatives by finance capital, as well as the troubling orientation of transition towards building new structures of accumulation around the vision of an electrified consumer society. We also see the coming decades being marked by the ever-increasing wealth of global asset-owning classes – who, by definition, enclose the atmospheric commons faster than any other community. Against this dystopian picture of increasingly concentrated wealth, corporate excess, and terrestrial crisis, we focus on the stubborn reproduction of socio-ecological life through various grounded projects across the world. We engage with communities who work against structural constraints to reproduce life from below through urban commoning, food sovereignty, Indigenous organising, and caretaking economies – all of which are scaling out their visions through alternative internationals. All of these projects, we argue, present a planetary and multiscalar political economy in practice, which connects grounded experience with resistance to the dynamics of capitalism at the state, corporate, and transnational levels. With lessons from these communities in mind, we call for a ‘planetary political economy of the global majority’, which prioritises the reproduction of socio-ecological life according to the visions of grounded anti-systemic projects.

Batteries containing cobalt will play a central role in the global transition to cleaner energy. Most of the world’s cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). However, the negative human rights image of the minerals sector in the DRC, and the emergence of an inaccurate and exploitative “blood cobalt” narrative risks harming small-scale, ‘artisanal’ producers who rely on this industry for their livelihood. The DRC government, civil society and small-scale producers already have a roadmap for ending child labour and improving working conditions. Countries and companies whose economies and business interests rely on these precious natural resources should engage with this roadmap rather than disengaging from the country’s mining sector altogether.

In 2021, the decision to close the last Norwegian coal mine on Svalbard was made, and with that, the Norwegian coal adventure on the archipelago came to an end. This was a result of a political process, which is the focus of this article. Drawing on fieldwork conducted during the fall of 2022, I argue that the political process of phasing out coal changed from a conflict over interests to a contest over symbolic capital. The article contributes to the understanding of Norwegian Svalbard politics and the “balancing act” that this represents. I focus on how power, in the form of shaping people’s perceptions and as prestige, influenced what interests prevail and why. The article addresses (1) why the decision to phase out coal was not made earlier, (2) what ultimately made this decision possible and (3) why and over what the key actors were still competing after the decision to phase out coal was made.

Transition intermediaries are expected to play an important role in the acceleration stage of the energy transition. While existing scholarship helps us understand the role of transition intermediaries in the early stages of transitions, it remains unclear what role intermediation plays in subsequent transition stages, especially at the local level where the implementation of policies and legislation takes place. In this article, we aim to investigate how intermediation takes shape in the acceleration stage of the energy transition. Drawing on the literature on transition intermediaries and intermediation at the local level, we explore the role of transition intermediaries in two local energy projects in the Netherlands. Through extensive qualitative research, we find that various actors can act as transition intermediaries and that a single actor can fulfil different intermediary roles simultaneously. Our findings contribute to the literature on transition intermediation and urban intermediaries, emphasising the key role intermediaries play in aligning innovations with existing institutional configurations. Furthermore, we highlight their role in connecting the energy transition to broader societal developments, including through citizen involvement in local and regional governance arrangements.

National regulatory authorities (NRAs) play a key role in energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. A recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified the requirements of NRA independence under European Union (EU) energy law. The Court classified the exclusive competence of NRAs to fix network tariffs as purely technical assessments of factual realities. This article challenges this assumption and examines whether the technical administrative tasks of NRAs can in fact be separated from political choices. It also explores the delineation of competences between NRAs and national governments at the EU and national levels, as exemplified by the Netherlands and by the proposed Dutch Energy Act.

Recent geopolitical and environmental events have created a new urgency for a just energy transition and a socially inclusive modernization of the energy sector. This article critically evaluates the extent to which Article 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as the competence provision of EU energy law, is congruent with the energy justice framework emerging from social sciences. It establishes the substantive scope and justiciability of Article 194(1) TFEU, including the legal principles and so-called ‘guiding principles’ of the provision relating to the internal market, environmental protection, and energy solidarity. The article analyzes the potential and shortcomings of Article 194(1) TFEU in contributing to more equitable decision-making processes in EU energy law. It concludes by evaluating the provision as a regulatory instrument that facilitates the (re)balancing of competing interests of the energy sector. This research further concludes that social considerations of energy justice cannot be sufficiently addressed through Article 194(1) TFEU.

This paper evaluates the wide discretion afforded to planning decision-makers in England. It does so in respect of a key but often overlooked question in the transition to renewables: whether developers/owners of onshore wind projects should be required to provide a ‘bond’ to ensure decommissioning and site restoration (DSR) occurs. Bonds are financial instruments that evidence ability to fund DSR. They help avoid legacy issues (eg project abandonment) but carry a long-term cost burden for developers/owners. A study of 275 projects elicits three issues. First, a lack of government guidance on bonding, vague ‘threshold’ terms in law and policy and failure of planning decision-makers to consider how others had decided the question result in a lack of markers to inform discretion, with bonds being rare (present in only 15.6% of projects) and their stringency inconsistent. Secondly, this lack of markers legitimises risky, cost-saving practices prohibited in offshore wind, where government guidance informs bonding decisions. Thirdly, reasons for decisions are weak or absent, inhibiting achievement of the justifications for their provision in an administrative context (eg disciplining decision-making). Whilst discretion enhanced capacity to generate electricity from wind through enabling a reduction of market entry costs, assisting movement towards renewable energy targets, it resulted in abandonment risk being ignored. This mirrors strategies adopted elsewhere in England's energy sector, such as coal and oil and gas, where a ‘light touch’ approach to bonding has, traditionally, been deployed to avoid hindering project development.

The last decade has witnessed the emergence and rise of trade disputes over renewable energy support measures. By pitting trade against the environment, these disputes ignited a considerable debate over the adequacy of the green policy space available under WTO law. This article examines whether and to what extent the first ten years of litigation settled the key issues in this debate by undertaking a systematic analysis of the developments in the case law and in the renewable energy policy landscape. The analysis reveals that the case law has raised more questions than answers and much uncertainty remains as to the scope of the policy space available for the subsidization of renewables. It also highlights how these disputes steered the debate away from the most contentious issue of subsidy regulation to the slam-dunk issue of non-discrimination. In doing so, they helped conceal rather than resolve the green policy space deficit in multilateral renewable energy subsidy governance.