A lively debate among students of parliamentary democracy concerns how coalition governments build their policy proposals. Some scholars maintain that government declarations mirror the position of the median party in parliament; others argue that these proposals better agree with the weighted mean of the coalition parties’ electoral promises. This article sheds light on this puzzle by investigating the role played by several political actors in shaping government declarations on two dimensions: the ideological left–right scale and a genuinely policy-based welfare scale. The results reveal that the agenda setters on the two dimensions do not coincide. On the left–right scale, the prime minister’s party plays a leading role. On the welfare scale, government declarations are affected by the party of the median legislator in parliament and by the parties of the labour and social affairs ministers. Furthermore, government declarations on the welfare dimension tend to drift rightwards with adverse economic conditions.

The history of the Italian Republic's territorial structure has always been intertwined with party competition. Partisan logics have notably played a relevant role in the ways regions have been moulded, set up and run. This article illustrates the discourse of Italy's political parties on the ‘ordinary’ statute regions throughout the successive phases of regionalisation. After the consensus reached in the Constituent Assembly, a paralysis due to party contrasts followed. The Centre-left governments in the 1960s re-started the process, which culminated in the 1970s–also thanks to the Communists’ support–in the establishment of the 15 ordinary-statute regions. The 1990s inaugurated a period of further devolution, which reached constitutional status in the early years of the millennium. Once again, partisan motivations were of primary importance, notably because of the electoral threat posed to mainstream parties by the Northern League. In recent years, party positions have differentiated consistently according to inter-coalition competitive dynamics.