International law resides at the confluence of law and politics and though it is guided by judicial judgement, it is particularly sensitive to political whim. Perceived economic interests are key to understanding the political motivations in international decision-making. In the UN model underof the Charter, international criminal law, and more specifically target selection for international criminal prosecutions, has been prejudicially skewed by economic/trade considerations. This chapter argues that target selection by the UN Security Council has historically been latently vetted according to economic considerations, inter alia, in a way that is unjust, and counter-productive to deterrence-based rationales. It further argues that the International Criminal Court, as a treaty-based body, is comparatively immune to most economic influences, at least by degree, and represents a positive evolution in the unbiased dispensation of international criminal justice. In support of this hypothesis this chapter reviews the target selection of UN based prosecutions (ad hoc and hybrid) and compares them to other grave situations not chosen for prosecution to conclude the determinative economic basis of target selection. It further iterates a comparison to ICC prosecutions where the independent court has initiated prosecutions in situations where the UN dared not to tread.