This paper contributes to a growing body of research on voting technology and voter confidence, which generally concludes that voters are less confident in technology—particularly in developed democracies. Using a unique survey experiment, this paper demonstrates that far fewer individuals are concerned about election fraud involving electronic voting, compared with other potential forms of election fraud such as registering ineligible voters or voter suppression. Other interesting findings emerge from the data: Older individuals are more concerned about fraud with electronic voting but the effects of age appear to be conditioned on political polarization. This paper advances our understanding of the impact of voting technology on electoral confidence, and raises important substantive and methodological questions about priming.

In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest whenanalyzing security protocols. Security protocols require inparticular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standardnotions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility andindistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether anattacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter stateswhether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runswith different values of the secret. Several decision procedureshave been developed so far for both notions but none of them can beapplied in the context of e-voting protocols, which requirededicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that bothdeduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial timefor two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.