Was the Gold Standard a major determinant of the onset and protracted character of the Great Depression of the 1930s in the USA and worldwide? In this paper, we model the “Gold Standard hypothesis” in an open-economy, dynamic general equilibrium framework. We show that encompassing the international and monetary dimensions of the Great Depression is important to understand the turmoil of the 1930s. In particular, the Gold Standard turns out to be a strong transmission mechanism of monetary shocks from the USA to the rest of the world. Our results also suggest that the waves of successive nominal exchange rate devaluations coupled with the monetary policy implemented in the USA might not have enhanced the recovery.

We formulate an overlapping-generations model with household heterogeneity and productive and nonproductive government programs to study the macroeconomic and intergenerational welfare effects of risk premium shocks and government debt reductions. We demonstrate that in a small open economy with a high level of debt, a small increase in the risk premium of the interest rate leads to a substantial contraction in output and negative welfare effects. We then quantify the effects of reducing the debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio using a wide range of fiscal austerity measures. Our results indicate trade-offs between short-run contractions and long-run expansions in aggregate output. In the short run, spending-based austerity reforms are worse than tax-based reforms in terms of lost income. However, in the long run, spending-based reforms produce higher output than tax-based reforms. In addition, welfare effects vary significantly across generations, skill groups, and working sectors. The current old and middle-aged generations experience welfare losses, whereas future generations are beneficiaries of the reforms.

This study presents a method for constructing a sequence of approximate solutions of increasing accuracy to general equilibrium models on nonlocal domains. The method is based on a technique originated from dynamical systems theory. The approximate solutions are constructed employing the Contraction Mapping Theorem and the fact that the solutions to general equilibrium models converge to a steady state. Under certain nonlocal conditions, the convergence of the approximate solutions to the true solution is proved. We also show that the proposed approach can be treated as a rigorous proof of convergence for the extended path algorithm in a class of nonlinear rational expectation models.

Several papers show that a privatization of the social security system will not be politically supported by the current generations. The asymmetry in the timing of welfare gains and losses is what generates a status quo bias in favor of the unfunded system. We explore a simple mechanism to offset the status quo problem using a general-equilibrium overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply calibrated to the Spanish economy. The mechanism implies a privatization of the social security system together with the elimination of compulsory retirement rules. Along the transition path, this mechanism drastically shortens (from three decades to only one decade) the convergence to the new steady state, diminishing the asymmetry in the timing of welfare gains and losses. As a result, there is an increase beyond 50% in the fraction of individuals that are better off with the implementation of such a reform.This work has benefited from useful comments by Jonathan Heathcote, Antonio Manresa, and seminar participants at CREB, Carlos III de Madrid, ESF Network in Social Insurance, and Stockholm School of Economics. We acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (SEC2000-0796) and Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR00-016).

Aggregate hours worked per working-age person decreased in Austria by 25% from 1970 to 2005. During the same time period, taxes increased, particularly the effective marginal tax rate on labor income. Using a standard general equilibrium growth model with taxes, I quantitatively assess the role played by the evolution of taxes in the evolution of hours worked in Austria. The model accounts for 76% of the observed decrease in hours worked per working-age person. My results are in line with other studies, which find taxes play an important role in explaining aggregate hours worked.

We demonstrate that multiple stationary rational-expectations equilibria exist in a version of Lucas's island economy. The existence of these equilibria follows from the fact that there is an indeterminate set of monetary equilibria in the two-period overlapping-generations model. We show how to construct stationary rational-expectations equilibria by randomizing over the set of nonstationary monetary equilibria. In some of our equilibria, a positively sloped Phillips curve exists even though our economy contains no signal-extraction problem as in the original Lucas paper. Our equilibria are indexed by beliefs and are examples of the existence of sunspot equilibria in which allocations may differ across states of nature for which preferences, technology, and endowments are identical. Our technique for constructing stationary sunspot equilibria should prove useful in a wide class of models in which an indeterminate stationary equilibrium exists.

Several papers show that a privatization of the social security system will not be politically supported by the current generations. The asymmetry in the timing of welfare gains and losses is what generates a status quo bias in favor of the unfunded system. We explore a simple mechanism to offset the status quo problem using a general-equilibrium overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply calibrated to the Spanish economy. The mechanism implies a privatization of the social security system together with the elimination of compulsory retirement rules. Along the transition path, this mechanism drastically shortens (from three decades to only one decade) the convergence to the new steady state, diminishing the asymmetry in the timing of welfare gains and losses. As a result, there is an increase beyond 50% in the fraction of individuals that are better off with the implementation of such a reform.This work has benefited from useful comments by Jonathan Heathcote, Antonio Manresa, and seminar participants at CREB, Carlos III de Madrid, ESF Network in Social Insurance, and Stockholm School of Economics. We acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (SEC2000-0796) and Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR00-016).