This chapter addresses the weaknesses of tax penalties in current law as deterrents of high-end tax noncompliance and describes how Congress could introduce tax penalties that vary depending upon taxpayers’ means. The chapter begins with a discussion of the possible motivations for individual tax compliance, including potential adverse consequences of noncompliance and, specifically, civil tax penalties. It then considers why current civil tax penalties often fail to deter high-end tax noncompliance. Finally, the chapter presents means-adjusted tax penalties as a new approach to the design of civil tax penalties, illustrates this approach with several examples, and addresses additional concerns.

This chapter describes two areas of legal theory that consider when means-based adjustments to legal rules may not be desirable. Under one perspective, means-based adjustments designed for redistributive purposes should be reserved for the tax system alone, since introducing means-based adjustments to other legal rules would entail greater efficiency costs. A second literature considers the desirability of a legal system that is impartial, nondiscriminatory, and general in its application. Subjecting taxpayers to different legal rules based on means could also undermine these important criteria. This chapter considers how means-based adjustments to the tax compliance rules should be evaluated from each of these perspectives, and why they would be justified even in cases where means-based adjustments to other legal rules would not be.

This chapter identifies ten lessons for international relations that emerge from the book.

This chapter presents latent nuclear deterrence theory. It explains how it is possible to gain international leverage from a nuclear program if countries do not have nuclear weapons.

This chapter addresses when nuclear latency leads to nuclear weapons proliferation and arms races. It shows that under certain conditions, nuclear latency can deter rivals from arming. In other situations, however, nuclear latency can foment nuclear weapons proliferation. It includes six case studies of nuclear proliferation: Argentina, Brazil, France, India, Pakistan, and South Africa.

This chapter conducts a statistical analysis of nuclear latency’s political consequences. Using a design-based approach to causal inference, it determines how the onset of nuclear latency influences several foreign policy outcomes: fatal military disputes, international crises, foreign policy preferences, and US troop deployments.

This chapter presents case studies from ten countries: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Spain. These cases show that many world leaders believe that nuclear latency provides greater international influence.

This chapter provides an overview of the book.

Processes of arms control and disarmament remain relevant in a world where armed conflict between states is still highly visible in international politics, and where civil wars and domestic conflicts claim hundreds of thousands of lives every year. Much attention is focused on the need to control and eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), especially nuclear weapons, given the hugely destructive nature of these armaments, but controlling so-called ‘conventional weapons’ – those not classed as WMDs – is also important. Conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, are responsible for most of the casualties we see today, even as arms control efforts have only recently begun to focus on these.

This chapter introduces some of the justifications for punishment and the purposes it seeks to achieve. It will also consider the wider goals which are claimed for international criminal law, alongside some of the challenges to international criminal law that have arisen.

In the Conclusion, I offer some remarks about the relation between the argument I developed over the course of the book, and whether applying it to our structurally unjust real world leaves the argument vulnerable to a number of criticisms. I discuss two issues in more detail: first, whether the unequal distribution of international crime prosecutions taints the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and whether the ICC does in fact deter crimes. Both issues are serious, but ultimately, I conclude that they do not weaken my argument. I end the book by highlighting just how radically the project of international criminal justice departs from earlier strategies for dealing with war and human rights violations.

The Conclusion returns to the book’s central questions and arguments. It considers the implications of the book’s findings for the conduct of oral hearings within RSD, and the impossibility of a just assessment of refugee applicants’ oral testimony against the current credibility criteria. While the aim of the book was not to advance precise reforms to RSD, in reflecting on what suggestions for reform arise, the Conclusion argues that if oral hearing must be a narrative occasion, it should be a more predictable one. Where applicants’ evidence is expected to fit within cognisable narrative forms, the hearing should provide the opportunity to meet these standards. However, such a reform would do nothing to address the narrative mandate traced and critiqued throughout the book. Finally, the Conclusion explores and holds open the possibility for certain texts and genres to present radical ways of imagining refugee narratives outside the strictures of refugee law, RSD and the extreme demands (and limits) currently placed on the testimony of refugee applicants.

Chapter 2 closely examines developments in the South African government’s position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from the mid-1970s to 1981. It starts with an overview of the emerging South African defence sector and the government’s growing parallel interest in building a nuclear deterrent. In addition, it also deals with the relationship between Pretoria and Washington, particularly analysing the way in which the United States under President Carter pressured South Africa to accede to the NPT and the continued defiance of non-proliferation norms by the apartheid regime. In general, the South African government experienced more resistance from the United States following Jimmy Carter’s election as President.