This book studied under which conditions the EU and its Member States influence the accountability of transnational corporations that are based in developing and emerging states for their involvement in human rights violations. Five conclusions are drawn. First, there are identifiable corporate concerns about the competitive threat of such corporations. They form a barrier to strengthening the accountability of EU-based corporations. Second, regulation has been adopted only when the ‘perceived interests’ in the EU and its Member States outweigh these concerns. Such interests are vastly different at the EU level and Member State level. Third, regulators have tried to minimise the impact on the competitiveness of their corporations by ‘extending’ their human rights regulations internationally. Fourth, bilateral agreements contain obligations relating to human rights and can serve to contribute to the creation of a ‘thick’ transnational stakeholder consensus. Local litigation is an important element in this process. Finally, there are valuable options to bring cases against corporations from developing and emerging states in EU Member States courts.

This chapter introduces ideas and controversies in international law scholarship on business and human rights. Furthermore, it determines the legal limitations for the EU and its Member States when regulating and remedying rights violations committed by corporations from emerging and developing states. To begin, domestic measures with extraterritorial implications are discussed. Import-restrictive measures also appear an attractive solution for states that are increasingly expected (or obliged) to rein in ‘their’ corporate nationals when they violate rights in third states. Such measures allow states to create an artificial level playing field that enforces the same standards across all corporations that operate in its market. Linking rights to trade concessions is, however, contested. The International Labour Organization and World Trade Organization regimes are discussed. Finally, it is explained that each state has acted unilaterally in developing the rules governing the use of civil adjudicative jurisdiction. Support for local remedies by the extraterritorial state does not distinguish between local and foreign corporations. A cost-benefit critique of extraterritorial remediation over foreign corporations is also presented.