Chapter 6 discusses Title IX under Secretary DeVos. It begins by describing how the Department of Education quickly broke from its predecessor before recounting the two-year process of promulgating new regulations. It then turns to the first of a two-chapter deeper dive into changes made to Title IX. Here, the chapter focuses on how the new regulations narrow what counts as actionable sexual harassment and weaken oversight of schools by the Department of Education. The chapter contends that most of these changes are deeply problematic and should be reversed.

The fourth chapter develops an abstract analytical framework of the different components of an international due diligence standard. It seeks to deduce those elements which due diligence obligations contain generally and irrespective of their application to specific fields of international law. With knowledge, capacities, and reasonableness three major components are identified: If a state knows of potential violations of international law, it is obliged to employ the reasonably available means at its disposal to prevent such violations or to sanction them should they occur nonetheless. The chapter then discusses common problems inherent in the application and implementation of due diligence obligations. Most notably, it elaborates on how the foreseeability threshold might be overcome; how the problem of diverging capacities could be addressed and whether all states have to adhere to the same standards of diligence; and finally how the vague and broad notion of reasonableness can be given substantial meaning.

In this chapter, I move on to resulting normative questions about the culpability principle, causal contribution, and command responsibility. I engage in deontic analysis of what type of contribution the culpability principle actually requires, and whether the requirement might be reconceived.

First, I will examine why criminal law requires causal contribution, and the degree of contribution required. I will argue that the requirement in relation to accessories is not onerous; ‘risk aggravation’ satisfies the culpability principle.

Second, I consider ambitious proposals to re-imagine culpability, i.e. to develop a new deontic account that does not require any causal contribution. A theme of this book is that ICL can present us with new questions that can lead us to adjust our basic assumptions from criminal law theory. On this issue, however, although the arguments are intriguing, my conclusion is that on a coherentist all-things-considered judgement, they are as yet far too tentative and undeveloped to provide a convincing basis for criminal sanctions. Accordingly, the current best theory is that accessories must at least elevate the risk of the crimes occurring.