The political idea of self-government has a natural elaboration, which is that a society is self-governing when it is ruled by the will of the people of that society. A variety of attempts to vindicate popular will conceptions of self-government exist but I argue that they are fatally flawed. In its place, we need a conception of self-government that is deflationary (that is does not rely on the existence of a popular will) but nevertheless quite demanding. I discuss some deflationary accounts of self-government and I argue for an account that emphasizes an egalitarian collective decision-making process but that also recognizes the importance of outcomes. I argue that attention to the conditions necessary to the achievement of self-government of an egalitarian sort is essential to how we are to think of the proper aims of constitutional institutions. We need to attend to how information is disseminated to citizens and how citizens can have the sophistication necessary to understand information. An egalitarian conception of self-government can show how the constitution of a society should be structured so as to achieve equality in these two dimensions of the information system.

How much of a role can human dignity play in constitutional law? It can certainly serve as a foundation of some or all of the rights that a constitution comprises, and it may also figure in the specific content of some of these rights. It may do this explicitly or implicitly – implicitly (as in the US Constitution) when dignity’s role is brought out in legal argument rather than the explicit text. Most rights that protect freedom implicate dignity, but so also do social and economic rights in the constitutions that have them. More generally human dignity may serve as a constitutional value, guiding the interpretation of other provisions: it does this, for example, explicitly in the Constitution of South Africa. It may also underpin the constitutional protection of democracy and the franchise, the rule of law, structures of accountability, the importance of citizenship, and the overall orientation of the provisions of the constitution towards respect for the ordinary people of the country that it governs.

Freedom in a choice does not just requires the absence of interference by another, whether with a preferred option or with any option; it requires the absence of domination: the absence of vulnerability to a power of interference on the part of another. Law and only law can guard citizens equally against the domination of others by identifying a common set of basic liberties and by providing intuitively adequate resourcing and protection against others to enable people to exercise those choices. But the state that imposes law will itself dominate all or some of its citizens if it is not subjected to a system of intuitively adequate, democratic control over its imposition of law. Such a system should enable people to shape the framework of government, to impose operational checks, constitutional and contestatory, on officials in government, and to appoint or oversee the appointment of such authorities.

There have been more than 400 years of research surrounding the state, but its concept remains iridescent and varies between different legal cultures. This contribution asks why and how the concept of the state evolved in continental Europe and examines why the term did not enter the legal terminology of England and later the US. It introduces four influential concepts of the state from the constitutional theory of the 19th and 20th century and shows how these concepts have set the paths on which debate around the state still moves today. Finally, the chapter revisits the most famous critiques of the concept, to then answer the central question surrounding the “state” in constitutional theory: what use does the concept retain today.

This chapter forms the context for the discussion in the following chapters analyzing various legal grounds for challenging automated government decision-making. It outlines the constitutional, human rights, and administrative law frameworks in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

The College of Cardinals is a key constituent organ within the papacy, its members being charged with electing the pope and with advising him. Cardinals were originally priests and deacons who assisted the pope in his liturgical and charitable duties around the city of Rome during the first millennium and also the Bishops of Rome’s neighboring “suburbicarian” dioceses. These three orders of clerics cohered into a single College during the Gregorian reform of the eleventh and twelfth centuries: their status and role in papal affairs has waxed and waned in the centuries since. Today the College is more diverse and representative of global Catholicism than at any point in the past. However, it is also a larger and a less cohesive body, whose members are less familiar with each other – or with the pope – than their predecessors were.

This chapter considers literary expressions of sovereignty in the nineteenth-century United States that underscore sovereignty’s oppositional nature and its productive potential, and it demonstrates how these literary expressions were, like public argument about sovereignty, constructed through the interplay between law and religion. Religious discourse provided a set of terms, examples, and motifs that shaped the nineteenth-century debate over political autonomy as it ranged across matters of territorial possession and the individual conscience. I first briefly address ideas of sovereignty that circulated in the long nineteenth century and informed US literature and public argument. Then I turn to competing visions of sovereignty expressed by the Cherokee Nation, the state of Georgia, the US federal government, and the US Supreme Court in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the final section, I briefly turn to the figure of John Brown who, in linking the vision of Indigenous sovereignty expressed by the Cherokee Nation to the sovereign individuality espoused by Henry David Thoreau and the Transcendentals, serves as a harbinger of the contests over political sovereignty that ultimately led to the US Civil War.

The chapter analyses the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) in South Africa, which is a hybrid legal system with both monist and dualist features. The largely successful judicial application of the Convention has been facilitated by the country’s constitution, which contains a provision on children’s rights and generous provisions regarding the judicial application of international treaties. The chapter shows that courts favour the application of the Convention as an interpretation tool for the children’s rights clause in the Constitution, but they neglect other possibilities of engagement, such as self-execution or statutory interpretation. This has resulted in lost opportunities to give judicial effect to the Convention. Courts also engage in sui generis forms of application, which has diversified the means of its application. The impact of the Convention is sometimes difficult to discern because of its overlap with domestic instruments. Nonetheless, the Convention has demonstrated its value added when gaps were found in the domestic law, although most often the influence of the Convention has been subtle and diffuse.

This chapter shows that constitutional intolerance is not only about religion or ethnoreligious identities. Much like ethnic and religious identities, LGBT identities have been subject to the regulation of their visibility in public space. This chapter discusses the anti-genderism of the Law and Justice party in relation to the hyphenation of Polish-Catholic identity and the historical role of the Catholic Church in promoting Polish independence, as well as the instrumentalisation thereof towards political polarisation in its domestic and European context. This chapter does not focus on the toolkit of illiberalism per se, but on the pseudo-constitutional anti-LGBT resolutions, declarations, and Family Charters targeting LGBT identities. A collaboration between the Law and Justice party and a think-tank called the Ordo Iuris Institute accounts for the first wave of this backlash, which invoked the constitution and legal language to allude to a semblance of constitutionalism.

This chapter explores the impact of science and technology’s objectifying gaze on society, Culture, and politics throughout history. It discusses how this gaze has turned the world into an object and humans into observers, diminishing moral, psychological, and political aspects. The chapter analyzes the duality of objectification, which renders man-made objects external despite embodying human values and actions. It examines the Industrial Revolution as a pivotal historical context where technology was seen as a mark of progress and an embodiment of objective Nature. Eventually, the human choices and interests behind technology were exposed, leading to the reconsideration of technologies from ethical, economic, political, and aesthetic viewpoints. The chapter also points to the ambivalence surrounding technology, including both fear and admiration, and how the disillusionment with technology has impacted the democratic epistemological framework. Additionally, it discusses the influence of philosophers-scientists like Descartes and Newton on modern dualistic cosmology, highlighting how science and technology have shaped various socio-political fields such as law, medicine, economics, and political science.

This chapter provides a rough summary of how the United States came to be a federation of states rather than a unitary nation. To that end, it offers a thumbnail sketch of the timeline from the British colonial period to adoption of the US Constitution. The debates at the constitutional convention and the advocacy in both the Federalist and Antifederalist Papers are highlighted, with particular emphasis on the role of state sovereignty and the menu of choices that were open to the framers.

This is the first of two chapters that relate the myriad ways in which state government has impeded true democracy in the United States. In this chapter, the focus is on those counter-majoritarian distortions that are hardwired into the Constitution. These structural barriers to majority rule include equal representation of small states and large states in the US Senate; the Electoral College; the constitutional provision under which a majority of state delegations to the US House of Representatives choose the president when there is no Electoral College majority; and the processes for appointing federal judges and amending the Constitution.