To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of “landmark” results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.

Deficits in self-awareness are commonly seen after Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and adversely affect rehabilitative efforts, independence and quality of life (Ponsford, 2004). Awareness models predict that executive and implicit functions are important cognitive components of awareness though the putative relationship between implicit and awareness processes has not been subject to empirical investigation (Crosson et al., 1989; Ownsworth, Clare, & Morris, 2006; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Severity of injury, also thought to be a crucial determinant of awareness outcome post-insult, is under-explored in awareness studies (Sherer, Boake, Levin, Silver, Ringholz, & Walter, 1998). The present study measured the contribution of injury severity, IQ, mood state, executive and implicit functions to awareness in head-injured patients assigned to moderate/severe head-injured groups using several awareness, executive, and implicit measures. Severe injuries resulted in greater impairments across most awareness, executive and implicit measures compared with moderate injuries, although deficits were still seen in the moderate group. Hierarchical regression results showed that severity of injury, IQ, mood state, executive and implicit functions made significant unique contributions to selective aspects of awareness. Future models of awareness should account for both implicit and executive contributions to awareness and the possibility that both are vulnerable to disruption after neuropathology. (JINS, 2010, 16, 1089–1098.)