This chapter discusses the relation between the Minimalist Program (MP) and Optimality Theory (OT) and shows that, contrary to popular belief, MP and OT are not inherently incompatible or competing frameworks/theories. The second section of this chapter provides some background on some characteristic features of MP and OT. The third section of this chapter shows that the hybrid system makes it possible to eliminate the EPP-features from MP by replacing them by an OT-evaluation of the output of the computational system. The third section discusses certain aspects of Scandinavian Object Shift. By splitting up the Minimal Link Condition into two separate conditions, we can derive Burzio's Generalization, and also capture differences between languages (and between constructions within a language) in whether nominative case can be licensed on an object in dative and ergative subject constructions.

Consciousness is only marginally relevant to artificial intelligence (AI), because to most researchers in the field other problems seem more pressing. The purpose of consciousness, from an evolutionary perspective, is often held to have something to do with the allocation and organization of scarce cognitive resources. This chapter describes Daniel Dennett's idea of the intentional stance, in which an observer explains a system's behavior by invoking such intentional categories as beliefs and goals. The computationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness ends up looking like a spoil-sport's explanation of a magic trick. The chapter focuses on critiques that are specifically directed at computational models of consciousness, as opposed to general critiques of materialist explanation. The contribution of artificial intelligence to consciousness studies has been slender so far, because almost everyone in the field would rather work on better defined, less controversial problems.