Chapter 6, “The Demands of Theoretical Reason and Self-Knowledge”, completes Kant’s account of empirical self-knowledge – the theoretical knowledge I have of myself as a psychological person. Following Kant’s general theory of knowledge, I argue that self-knowledge requires – in addition to a cognition of myself – an attitude of assent towards this cognition and an epistemic ground for holding this cognition to be true. By laying out different types of epistemic grounds, I distinguish corresponding levels of self-knowledge. The highest level is a complete comprehension of myself based on an a priori idea of myself as a whole. While this highest level can never be attained, it sets the normative standard for all lower levels of self-knowledge. Hence, we are bound to conceptualize all psychological phenomena in accordance with a system of psychological predicates, and to approximate a complete individual self-concept, which, if available, would completely a+H9nd fully adequately describe an individual person. Finally, I outline possibilities of error, such as self-blindness and self-deceit, and revaluate the doctrine of transparency that is often ascribed to Kant.