Strategy is a not a word not often used in connection with early medieval warfare ,which is often seen as mere feud or the gathering of loot. This was strongly reinforced by the widespread attitude that military history was a fit subject only for military academies. Only recently has it been recognised that war in this period was the subject of thought, care and calculation. Moreover, early medieval sources are relatively scarce and often pose difficulties of interpretation. And armies had no continuous institutional life of the kind we associate with the formation of strategic ideas. Nor were kings able to impose a monopoly of violence on their followers, for early medieval states were fragile and highly dependent upon the accidents of individual ability. The armies which were gathered were not unitary, but assemblages of diverse elements whose political relation to the sovereign was problematic. But although writing about strategy poses challenges, it is evident that military commanders in this period were not mere bloodthirsty brutes. An army, even a small one, represented a huge financial and political investment whose raising could only be justified by some substantial purpose. But the nature of medieval strategy was conditioned by the political structures which created it. A world where dynastic continuity and political stability were closely intertwined, and where kings were rulers of peoples rather than territories, gave birth to a very different kind of strategic outlook from our own.

At the heart of most sacks – in terms of motivation, behaviour and the broad participation of common soldiers – lay plunder. This chapter explores British sack plunder in the Napoleonic era from multiple perspectives: the broad campaign and siege contexts in which it occurred; the dynamics and rituals of plunder on the ground; and the attitudes and practices of officers. Most British rank and file participated in the plunder of stormed towns, borne of customary right, the catharsis of passing through the breaches, and opportunism. Despite the seeming chaos, this plunder had its own distinct rituals, conventions and carnivalesque dimensions. Some officers were complicit, too, in tolerating plunder, or indulging themselves; and in India, given the traditions of Company plunder and profit-taking, officers were only too eager to enjoy the official spoils of distributed prize. Yet, whilst there was a general resignation that it was next to impossible to prevent the plunder of stormed towns, most officers, and some men from the ranks, were highly critical of troops doing so, on military and moral grounds, drawing particular attention to the drunkenness, destruction and violence that accompanied it.

This chapter examines the practical matter of resources in war-making, both human and material. The first half assesses recruitment practices across the course of Roman history, especially the role of conscription and compulsion, and then the changing size of military forces through time and its likely demographic impact. Consideration is also given to the logistical implications of the size of campaign armies. The second half focuses on the financial costs of maintaining the armed forces in the different periods of Roman history, before turning to the financial benefits of warfare, including booty, indemnities, territory and taxes – as well as the material costs of defeat. The quantitative dimension of all these subjects means that much of the discussion concerns the limitations of the extant evidence.

The Appendices supply vital information on the dynamics of the Caste War. Voluminous tables summarize the quantitative information I found on rebel assaults and army attacks. Concise and in chronological order, they represent most of the data on which this book is based. Although some minor events may be missing due to the lack of relevant data, to my knowledge this is the most detailed and most extensive compilation on these issues to date. It presents information on targets, military strength, the number, gender and status of victims (Indian or vecino), the amount of booty taken, and the losses and casualties suffered by the respective attackers. These facts allow us to grasp the changing nature of the war and gain key insights into the structure of individual rebel assaults on Yucatecan settlements, on the one hand, and army thrusts into rebel territory, on the other.