This chapter covers the turbulent period of the de facto independent Chechnya in the 1990s, characterized by the resurgence of traditionalism and religion. The war that broke out between Moscow and Chechen separatists in 1994 reduced state capacity to rubble and made the ideology of political Islam dominant among Chechen politicians. After the end of the First Chechen War in 1996, the victorious separatist leaders enacted Sharia. This chapter contends that promotion of Sharia in independent Chechnya was not driven by ideology or demand by the population. It shows that this strategy was used by incumbents to increase their legitimacy by association with religion and tradition, through distance from the Kremlin, and with concessions to the powerful constituency of former rebels. At the same time, the incumbents were wary of strengthening the non-state forums too much, because they were afraid that powerful legal systems based on tradition and religion would become arenas of political contestation and ultimately be hijacked by the opposition. The rulers turned to promotion of Sharia and custom only when they were directly challenged and needed to reinforce political control regardless of the costs.

In its transition from pre-Islamic Arab custom to the Shari‘a, the Islamic law of homicide underwent a series of modifications, designed to make it fit Islamic values and principles. This chapter discusses two such major modifications. The first one involves restricting the liability for blood revenge to the perpetrator, while the second sharpens the distinction between accidental and intentional homicide. It is argued that by these modifications Muslim jurists emphasized individual responsibility, intention, fault rather than mere causation, and punishment rather than compensation, thereby bringing homicide closer to a crime. In this way, they expressed the conception that homicide is an offense against the interests of the entire community, and not just against private rights.