In the absence of a treaty protocol or verification regime, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) instituted confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a mechanism to increase confidence in compliance by enhancing transparency and mitigating ambiguities regarding states parties’ biological activities. While a promising tool to support treaty compliance, low participation, concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of CBM submissions, a dearth of analysis, and restricted access to many submissions have limited CBMs’ value. Through interviews with 53 international experts—38 from BWC delegations and 15 independent experts—we identified concrete opportunities to increase CBMs’ value while mitigating the burden on states parties. This study supports states parties’ efforts in the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention, as part of a series of research on BWC assurance that aims to characterize challenges around BWC verification and increase certainty in BWC compliance.

This article discusses the contingencies and complexities of CRISPR. It outlines key problems regarding off-target effects and replication of experimental work that are important to consider in light of CRISPR’s touted ease of use and diffusion. In light of literature on the sociotechnical dimensions of the life sciences and biotechnology and literature on former bioweapons programs, this article argues that we need more detailed empirical case studies of the social and technical factors shaping CRISPR and related gene-editing techniques in order to better understand how they may be different from other advances in biotechnology — or whether similar features remain. This information will be critical to better inform intelligence practitioners and policymakers about the security implications of new gene-editing techniques.

The German army's 1943 flooding of the Pontine Marshes south of Rome, which later caused a sharp rise in malaria cases among Italian civilians, has recently been described by historian Frank Snowden as a unique instance of biological warfare and bioterrorism in the European theater of war and, consequently, as a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and biological warfare. We argue that archival documents fail to support this allegation, on several counts. As a matter of historical record, Hitler prohibited German biological weapons (BW) development and consistently adhered to the Geneva Protocol. Rather than biological warfare against civilians, the Wehrmacht used flooding, land mines, and the destruction of vital infrastructure to obstruct the Allied advance. To protect its own troops in the area, the German army sought to contain the increased mosquito breeding likely to be caused by the flooding. Italians returning to the Pontine Marshes after the German retreat in 1944 suffered malaria as a result of environmental destruction, which was banned by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and by subsequent treaties. In contrast, a state's violation of the Geneva Protocol, whether past or present, involves the use of germ weapons and, by inference, a state-level capability. Any allegation of such a serious violation demands credible evidence that meets high scientific and legal standards of proof.

Synthetic biology seeks to create modular biological parts that can be assembled into useful devices, allowing the modification of biological systems with greater reliability, at lower cost, with greater speed, and by a larger pool of people than has been the case with traditional genetic engineering. We assess the offensive and defensive security implications of synthetic biology based on the insights of leading synthetic biologists into how the technology may develop, the projections of practicing biosecurity authorities on changes in the security context and potential security applications of synthetic biology, and joint appraisals of policy relevant sources of uncertainty. Synthetic biology appears to have minimal security implications in the near term, create modest offensive advantages in the medium term, and strengthen defensive capabilities against natural and engineered biological threats and enable novel potential offensive uses in the long term. To maximize defensive and minimize offensive effects of synthetic biology despite uncertainty, this essay suggests a combination of policy approaches, including community-based efforts, regulation and surveillance, further research, and the deliberate design of security and safety features into the technology.