This chapters traces the evolution of the Nova Holanda gang’s governance practices from the mid-1990s until the occupation of Maré by the Brazilian Military in April 2014 through the analysis of newspaper archives, oral histories with residents and gang members, and a dataset of anonymous gang denunciations. Following its integration into the Comando Vermelho faction, CVNH maintained a benevolent dictator regime, combining high levels of coercion with responsive benefits, until several years of warfare with their primary rival led to the use of extreme forms of coercion against residents as disorder prevailed. By 2004, the war between CVNH and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) had ended though enforcement continued to be active and frequent, leading to a social bandit regime, in which the gang offered significant benefits and engaged in low levels of coercion. Then, following the resurgence of TCP in 2009 until the arrival of the Brazilian military, CVNH can be considered a benevolent dictator gang once again. They ramped up their coercive behavior in response to TCP’s more aggressive posture while providing significant benefits to avoid frequent police enforcement efforts.

This chapter focuses on the governance practices of the Comando Vermelho gang that has controlled Complexo da Maré’s most populous favela, Parque União, for more than three decades. Like their CVNH allies, CVPU has been part of the CV faction for this entire period. And yet, their governance styles have diverged considerably. CVPU evinces a less chaotic evolution as they have remained, aside from several years at the turn of the millennium, a social bandit regime. Overall, the absence of an active rival threat has produced a gang that employs far lower levels of coercion than their counterparts while active enforcement has incentivized CVPU to provide significant benefits to residents. This chapter traces the evolution of these dynamics through a combination of oral histories with residents and gang members, analysis of newspaper archives and anonymous denunciations, as well as participant observation during the author’s time living in Maré.

This chapter develops the concept of criminalized governance, defining it as the structures and practices through which criminalized groups control territory and manage relations with local populations. It distinguishes between two primary dimensions: coercion and the provision of benefits. The chapter then provides detailed descriptions of the various activities and behaviors included within each of these dimensions. A typology of criminalized governance regimes is then presented, which contains five ideal types: disorder, benevolent dictator, tyrant, social bandit, and laissez-faire. Finally, existing explanations from the literature on criminalized governance in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are addressed.