In the subject of optimal stopping, the classical secretary problem is concerned with optimally selecting the best of n candidates when their relative ranks are observed sequentially. This problem has been extended to optimally selecting the kth best candidate for k ≥ 2. While the optimal stopping rule for k=1,2 (and all n ≥ 2) is known to be of threshold type (involving one threshold), we solve the case k=3 (and all n ≥ 3) by deriving an explicit optimal stopping rule that involves two thresholds. We also prove several inequalities for p(k, n), the maximum probability of selecting the k-th best of n candidates. It is shown that (i) p(1, n) = p(n, n) > p(k, n) for 1<k<n, (ii) p(k, n) ≥ p(k, n + 1), (iii) p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n + 1) and (iv) p(k, ∞): = lim n→∞p(k, n) is decreasing in k.

We drive a car along a street towards our destination and look for an available parking place without turning around. Each parking place is associated with a loss which decreases with the distance of the parking place from our destination. Assume that the states (empty or filled) of the parking places form a Markov chain. We want to find an optimal parking strategy to minimize the expected loss. A curious example is constructed and two sufficient conditions for the existence of the threshold-type optimal parking strategy are given.

Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common knowledge assumptions, enabling players to anticipate their co-players' strategies. Under these assumptions, disparate anomalies emerge. Instrumental rationality, conventionally interpreted, fails to explain intuitively obvious features of human interaction, yields predictions starkly at variance with experimental findings, and breaks down completely in certain cases. In particular, focal point selection in pure coordination games is inexplicable, though it is easily achieved in practice; the intuitively compelling payoff-dominance principle lacks rational justification; rationality in social dilemmas is self-defeating; a key solution concept for cooperative coalition games is frequently inapplicable; and rational choice in certain sequential games generates contradictions. In experiments, human players behave more cooperatively and receive higher payoffs than strict rationality would permit. Orthodox conceptions of rationality are evidently internally deficient and inadequate for explaining human interaction. Psychological game theory, based on nonstandard assumptions, is required to solve these problems, and some suggestions along these lines have already been put forward.

In a sequence of Markov-dependent trials, the optimal strategy which maximizes the probability of stopping on the last success is considered. Both homogeneous Markov chains and nonhomogeneous Markov chains are studied. For the homogeneous case, the analysis is divided into two parts and both parts are realized completely. For the nonhomogeneous case, we prove a result which contains the result of Bruss (2000) under an independence structure.