Do locals discriminate against themselves by favoring foreigners with higher expected purchasing power? Drawing on theories of prejudice, discrimination, and colonialism, I argue that in colonized and post-colonial countries, local home sellers discriminate against local potential homebuyers while favoring foreigners with expected higher purchasing power, anticipating a more profitable transaction. I support this argument with evidence from a preregistered online audit study targeting discriminatory attitudes toward local home buyers. In the study, fictitious home buyers with distinctive language and ethnic names emailed 1,512 home sellers (realtors and homeowners) across all municipalities in Puerto Rico. Home sellers reported more houses available to Americans and invited them to more house showings than Puerto Ricans. My estimates indicate that ethnic discrimination exists in the Puerto Rican housing market. These findings provide new insights into ethnic dynamics in colonized and post-colonial societies and underscore concerns about recent legislation that turned Puerto Rico into a tax haven.

Researchers are often interested in whether discrimination on the basis of racial cues persists above and beyond discrimination on the basis of nonracial attributes that decision makers—e.g., employers and legislators—infer from such cues. We show that existing audit experiments may be unable to parse these mechanisms because of an asymmetry in when decision makers are exposed to cues of race and additional signals intended to rule out discrimination due to other attributes. For example, email audit experiments typically cue race via the name in the email address, at which point legislators can choose to open the email, but cue other attributes in the body of the email, which decision makers can be exposed to only after opening the email. We derive the bias resulting from this asymmetry and then propose two distinct solutions for email audit experiments. The first exposes decision makers to all cues before the decision to open. The second crafts the email to ensure no discrimination in opening and then exposes decision makers to all cues in the body of the email after opening. This second solution works without measures of opening, but can be improved when researchers do measure opening, even if with error.

Name-based treatments have been used in observational studies and experiments to study the differential effect of identity—commonly race or ethnic minority status. These treatments are typically assumed to signal only a single characteristic. If names unintentionally signal other characteristics, then the treatment can violate information equivalence, and estimated treatment effects cannot be attributed to the desired characteristic alone. Using results from a name perception study paired with an original correspondence audit experiment of U.S. state legislators, we show that names manipulate perceptions of minority status, socioeconomic status (SES), and migrant status. Our audit study shows that low SES status is related to reply rates both across and within each racial category. These results provide evidence that discrimination cannot be easily attributed singularly to the intended treatment of minority status but rather reflect a more multifaceted form of discrimination. More generally, our results provide an example of how name-based treatments manipulate more than the intended characteristic, which means that estimated treatment effects cannot be interpreted as being manipulated solely by the desired characteristic. Future studies with name-based or other informational treatments should account for the potential violation of information equivalence in their research design and interpretation of results.