This chapter by the philosopher Johanna Thoma focuses on the ‘moral proxy problem’, which arises when an autonomous artificial agent makes a decision as a proxy for a human agent, without it being clear for whom specifically it does so. Thoma recognises that, in general, there are broadly two categories of agents an artificial agent can be a proxy for: low-level agents (individual users or the kinds of human agents artificial agents are usually replacing) and high-level agents (designers, distributors, or regulators). She argues that we do not get the same recommendations under different agential frames: whilst the former suggests the agents be programmed without risk neutrality, which is common in choices made by humans, the latter suggests the contrary, since the choices are considered part of an aggregate of many similar choices. The author argues that the largely unquestioned implementation of risk neutrality in the design of artificial agents deserves critical scrutiny. Such scrutiny should reveal that the treatment of risk is intimately connected with our answer to the questions about agential perspective and responsibility.

The law scholar Dustin Lewis explores the requirements of international law with regard to the employments of AI-related tools and techniques in armed conflict. The scope of this chapter is not limited to Lethal Autonomous Weapons (AWS) but also encompasses other AI-related tools and techniques related to warfighting, detention, and humanitarian services. After providing an overview of international law applicable to armed conflict, the author outlines some preconditions necessary to respect international law. According to Lewis, current international law essentially presupposes humans – and not artificial, non-humans – as legal agents. From that premise, the author argues that any employment of AI-related tools or techniques in an armed conflict needs to be susceptible to being administered, discerned, attributed, understood, and assessed by human agents.