To mark the passing of two decades since the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords handed down their judgment in the appeal of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank this article considers the enduring impact of the decision in terms of the constitutional position of the Church of England as a national church and analyses the public and private functions which it undertakes. In the altered landscape of the new Carolean era, with a decline in church attendance and a rise in secularism, it examines the reasoning of the five separate opinions delivered by the Law Lords and evaluates in retrospect various of the issues raised.

This article discusses the application of the proportionality test which the Court of Session in Scotland and the European Court of Human Rights carried out when reviewing the limitations to worship and public gatherings imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The article concludes that judges should not use the proportionality standard of review as an avenue to circumvent their duty of neutrality towards religious dogmas.

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.

The theme of the Ecclesiastical Law Society's 2016 Day Conference, ‘Freedom of/from religion’, reflects the growing interest in the idea that, in addition to a right to freedom of religion, there is a right to ‘freedom from’ religion. In recent years, there has been a trend towards increased use of the language of freedom from religion in academic literature and in material produced by practitioners, organisations and activists in discussions of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on religious freedom is well known and is the subject of frequent comment. The aim of this paper is to present an overview of a particular aspect, where the ECtHR had to consider a dispute in which a religious court was involved at an earlier stage. In these cases, nolens volens, the ECtHR had to adjudicate upon the competence and procedure of these courts and tribunals. To date, there have only been nine such cases, of which only three have led to a judgment. Yet, from the remaining six which were declared inadmissible or manifestly ill-founded, there is something to be learned about the approach of the ECtHR to religious courts.

This article offers a systematic analysis of the plenary Chamber of the French Cour de Cassation's final decision in the Baby Loup case which held that a private nursery had acted lawfully when requiring an employee to remove her jilbab at work, in accordance with the religious neutrality requirements of the nursery's policy. The article examines the decision in light of ECHR and French domestic legal requirements. First, it is argued that laïcité—rightly held to be irrelevant—still unduly taints the reasoning. As a result, proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions are not properly applied. Secondly, the decision is compared and contrasted with recent ECtHR cases, notably Eweida and Others v UK. It is argued that a Baby Loup-type restriction does not meet ECHR standards. Additionally the margin of appreciation, used by the ECtHR to save the French ban on the full-covering of the face in the SAS case, should not, as will be demonstrated, come into play in a Baby Loup context.