In this chapter, the metaphysics of quantum possibilities, as a form of res potentia, is discussed. The transactional picture, together with quantum possibility, can be understood in terms of Kant’s contrast between phenomena and noumena, with quantum possibility constituting an element of the noumenal realm. This formulation sheds light on the connection between the two realms. It also provides a “middle way” between realism and antirealism and resolves puzzles surrounding the notion of causation. Concerns about structural realism are also addressed.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of the development of quantum theory, with a critical focus on the antirealist tradition inaugurated by Niels Bohr. The distinction between “principle theories” and “constructive theories” is discussed, and it is noted that quantum mechanics is a “principle theory.” It is argued that quantum theory is amenable to a fully realist interpretation provided we let go of the demand that reality be classically picturable.

The account developed in Chapter 2 may seem to conflict with Kant’s view that the judgment of taste is a distinctive sort of judgment requiring critical investigation. It has been argued, on the other hand, that Kant’s view is confused: there is no sense of “subjectivity” that sets the judgment of taste apart from other judgments (such as judgments of color) that also lay claim to normativity but present no special problem. This chapter addresses both objections. My reading suggests a requisite sense of “subjectivity.” The judgment of taste is subjective for two related reasons. The first has to do with its essential singularity, which, as I elaborate it, is more radical than the denial of principles or the holism of reasons associated with aesthetic or moral particularism. The second reason is tied to the distinctiveness of the judgment of taste’s claim to normativity. I argue that the judgment of taste represents its object as calling for recognition, where aesthetic recognition should be understood as akin to the acknowledgment of a person. My account yields an explanation of the “autonomy” of taste, according to which one’s judgment of taste must be grounded in one’s own experience of the object.

Realism – as its name suggests – ought to be thought of primarily as a metaphysical thesis. Realism is a commitment to reality, and reality is the domain of metaphysical study. Though realism is connected to matters both epistemological and semantic, it is suggested that realism, at its core, be construed as fundamentally a metaphysical view. Hence it is suggested that, when we contemplate the thorny question of what realism is, we employ the notion of truthmaking. Truthmaker theory, which falls squarely within the domain of metaphysics, is perfectly suited to articulate what realism is all about. It therefore enjoys an advantage over attempts to define realism in terms of truth, reference, or any semantic notion. This chapter presents a truthmaker-based conception of the debate between realism and antirealism, and showcase its virtues in helping us to understand a perennial metaphysical topic. It first shows how truthmaking is a more useful tool than truth in defining realism. Then the book’s account of realism, which is applied to the realism debates in metaethics and the philosophy of science, is defended. Along the way, a projectivist attitude toward truthmaking for quasirealists is motivated.