Criticism of the biomedical model of psychiatry that regards mental illness as brain disease has been labelled ‘anti-psychiatry’. Critical psychiatry arises out of so-called anti-psychiatry, but has additional roots in transcultural psychiatry, its alliance with psychiatric user/survivor groups, and the methodological critique of the neuroscientific basis of mental health problems and psychiatric treatment effectiveness. It is not opposed to psychiatry as such and argues for a person-centred shift for practice and research. This article discusses how a more truly biopsychosocial model, which critiques the biomedical model to produce a more relational practice, is needed not only for psychiatry but also for medicine in general.

Critical psychiatry is associated with anti-psychiatry and may therefore seem to be an embarrassing hangover from the 1970s. However, its essential position that functional mental illness should not be reduced to brain disease overlaps with historical debates in psychiatry more than is commonly appreciated. Three examples of non-reductive approaches, like critical psychiatry, in the history of psychiatry are considered.

Critical psychiatry has often been confused with what is widely known as ‘anti-psychiatry’. In this article the distinction is clarified and the particular contribution critical psychiatry makes is outlined. That contribution is constructive criticism: of the relationship between medicine and mental health practice, of the way drug and psychotherapeutic treatments for mental health difficulties might be better understood. These have implications for everyday clinical practice and there is much to be gained by openly embracing the controversies critical psychiatry highlights.

Knowledge about attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is rapidly accumulating. Recent advances in diagnosis, genetics, neuroimaging, drug and non-drug treatments are considered, and the results are related to the critical attack on the ADHD diagnosis, which argues it a medicalising social construct, unhelpfully sustaining power relationships. The advances reviewed suggest that, while this attack can be conclusively dismissed as wrong and misleading, the phenomenological definition of ADHD is no longer sufficient for construct validity, though continues to be valuable as a guide for clinicians. The humanising and individualising concerns underlying the attack on the diagnosis could usefully be redirected to improving effective measurement of patient outcomes.