Russell and Burch’s 1959 original definitions of the 3Rs (replacement, reduction and refinement) are widely used today as standards for the ethical use of non-human animals in research, although they have a number of limitations. Authors and institutions around the world have addressed some of these, coming up in certain cases with more accurate, functional, and up-to-date definitions. However, not only do there still remain limitations needing to be addressed, but some that have been addressed resulted in discrepancies, contradictions, and general confusion as to how best apply the 3Rs in practice. In order to clarify the meaning of the 3Rs and enable more optimal implementation of these principles in animal experimentation, this article provides a theoretical discussion for revised definitions of the original 3Rs via examination of some of their main limitations and inconsistencies. First, we offer up the original definitions as presented in the context of Russell and Burch’s book The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Then, we examine the main limitations and present clear specifications and requirements for such revised definitions. After presenting our revised definitions, we conclude with various implications for animal welfare within the context of experimentation.

Animal experimentation raises value conflicts between animal protection and other goods, such as freedom of inquiry or health and safety. If governments can phase out the practice by non-prohibitive incentive-setting, the pro tanto moral rationale for doing so is obvious. So why should they not? This article first sketches a fictional scenario in which a government adopts a phase-out plan for animal experimentation. It then considers two moral objections to this plan: First, the plan unduly restricts freedom of inquiry, and second, it merely displaces animal experimentation across borders and thus fails to reduce animal suffering. Both arguments are refined premise by premise to articulate their strongest versions. The two objections can help to narrow down desiderata for good phase-out plans. However, they do not provide a compelling case against phase-out planning as such because they miss its incremental and constructive nature. Unless better arguments can be provided, it appears that government inaction on phasing out animal experimentation lacks moral justification.

Institutions using animals for research typically have a veterinarian who is responsible for the veterinary care programme and compliance with regulatory obligations. These veterinarians operate at the interface between the institution’s animal research programme and senior management. Veterinarians have strong public trust and are well positioned to share information about animals used for scientific purposes, but their perspectives on sharing information with the public are not well documented and their perceptions of transparency may influence how institutional policies are developed and applied. The objective of our study was to analyse the perceptions of institutional transparency among laboratory animal veterinarians working at different universities. Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were used to describe perceptions of 16 attending veterinarians relating to animal research transparency. Three themes were drawn from the interviews: (i) reflections on transparency; (ii) reflections on culture; and (iii) reflections on self. Veterinarians reflected on their personal priorities regarding transparency and when combined with barriers to change within the institutions, sometimes resulted in reported inaction. For example, sometimes veterinarians chose not to pursue available opportunities for change at seemingly willing universities, while others had their initiatives for change blocked by more senior administrators. The sharing of information regarding the animals used for scientific purposes varied in how it was conceptualised by attending veterinarians: (i) true transparency; communication of information for the sake of openness; (ii) strategic transparency; attempt to educate people about animal research because then they will support it; (iii) agenda-driven transparency; selective release of positive stories to direct public opinion; and (iv) fearful non-transparency; not communicating any information for fear of negative opposition to animal research. Transparency was not perceived as an institutional priority by many of the veterinarians and a cohesive action plan to increase transparency that involves multiple universities was identified as a promising avenue to overcome existing barriers.

Three recently developed and published schemes to evaluate the acceptability of proposed animal experiments are discussed and compared:

1. The model developed at the request of the Dutch Veterinary Public Health Chief Inspectorate by the Department of Animal Problems of Leiden University (the ‘Dutch Model’);

2. The model proposed by the Canadian, David G Porter (the ‘Porter model’);

3. The model developed by the British Institute of Medical Ethics, published in ‘Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical Research’ (the ‘IME model’).

It is concluded that the Porter model, although compact, does not have an acceptable level of discrimination; nor does it provide the researcher with any pragmatic tools to optimize the research design. The other models appear to be quite adequate for the different purposes for which they were developed. The Dutch model was developed to guide the evaluation procedure at the level of local institution-based committees (ie internal evaluation by colleagues), whereas the IME model will serve the professional officers of the United Kingdom Home Office Inspectorate (ie external evaluation).

Finally, the pragmatic consequences of the three models are discussed with respect to two hypothetical cases.

The use of genetically modified (GM) animals in biomedical research has increased during recent years and its ethical aspects have been subject to ongoing academic discussion. In order to reinforce this discussion, we analysed applications submitted to animal ethics committees in Sweden during 2002. The aim was to investigate the researchers' statements concerning the production and use of GM animals, as well as the committees' assessments of the applications. For our analysis, we constructed an analytic form. In part, we included the questions and categories of the mandatory application form, noting for example species, degree of severity regarding pain and distress, the management of pain, and endpoints. In addition, we included our own specific questions and categories, and classified the applications accordingly. In particular we focused on the methods of GM animal production and on the expected clinical symptoms attributable to genetic modification and experimental use. Our analysis, which was partly quantitative and partly qualitative, revealed that applications were often approved by the committees despite containing insufficient information regarding ethically relevant aspects, that the arguments for using GM animals were often unclear, and that some applicants indicated awareness of possible unintentional welfare effects attributable to genetic modification. In more than 36% of the applications, obvious or minor clinical symptoms attibutable to genetic modification were expected. However, we also noted that many applicants emphasised that certain GM animals were to be used without the expectation that the animals would display any clinical symptoms. This was obviously viewed as an ethical advantage.

Although the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling states it is:

its Article VIII allows any Contracting Government to:

This paper takes up Axel Honneth’s suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth’s idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch’s idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established.

Behavioural animal experimentation is an inseparable part of research trying to understand the biological underpinnings of human behaviour, diseases and disorders. Working with animals comes with great responsibility to achieve reliable and reproducible results of highest scientific quality. In a simple step-by-step fashion, we highlight some common issues that may occur along the path to conducting behavioural animal experimentations and posit some solutions and grounds to ensure the excellence of work done in this research area while aspiring to improve conditions for laboratory animals. It entails topics of study design, animal and experimenter welfare, experimental considerations and frequentist biostatistics. At the end, we direct to some guidelines and manuals that may prove valuable to researchers in this field. Our ten simple tips and traps are meant for students who are learning about important concepts for the first time; graduates whose statistics training all too often has neglected the concept of power in experimental design; and researches who would like a light-hearted refresher on these topics. With this perspective, we hope that you will avoid falling into traps and find answers to what you always wanted to know about conducting behavioural animal experimentation.

The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler, and Christine Grady to animal research. These requirements are (1) social value, (2) scientific validity, (3) independent review, (4) fair subject selection, (5) favorable risk–benefit ratio, (6) informed consent, and (7) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we ban animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits—which would be ethically problematic.

In 1966, Henry K. Beecher published an article entitled “Ethics and Clinical Research” in the New England Journal of Medicine, which cited examples of ethically problematic human research. His influential paper drew attention to common moral problems such as inadequate attention to informed consent, risks, and efforts to provide ethical justification. Beecher’s paper provoked significant advancements in human research policies and practices. In this paper, we use an approach modeled after Beecher’s 1966 paper to show that moral problems with animal research are similar to the problems Beecher described for human research. We describe cases that illustrate ethical deficiencies in the conduct of animal research, including inattention to the issue of consent or assent, incomplete surveys of the harms caused by specific protocols, inequitable burdens on research subjects in the absence of benefits to them, and insufficient efforts to provide ethical justification. We provide a set of recommendations to begin to address these deficits.

Recent results from the neurosciences demonstrate that pleasure and pain are not two symmetrical poles of a single scale of experience but in fact two different types of experiences altogether, with dramatically different contributions to well-being. These differences between pleasure and pain and the general finding that “the bad is stronger than the good” have important implications for our treatment of nonhuman animals. In particular, whereas animal experimentation that causes suffering might be justified if it leads to the prevention of more suffering, it can never by justified merely by leading to increased levels of happiness.

The advent of the open access (OA) movement in publishing has been instrumental in causing a shift in the accessibility of research findings published in academic journals. The adoption of OA and other online publication models means that the results of scientific research published in journals using a free access (FA) framework are now available, free of charge, to anyone with access to the Internet. FA journals typically require a payment from the authors of a manuscript, which has raised concerns about the quality of work published in them; accepting payment from an author may compromise a journal’s acceptance criteria. This study addresses whether journal policy on the treatment of animals is influenced by whether a journal follows a FA publishing model, and whether a requirement to pay for publication has an influence. A random sample of 332 biomedical journals listed in the ISI Web of Knowledge and Directory of Open Access Journals databases were assessed for whether they had an ethical policy on publishing animal studies, and what form of publication framework they used (103 of the journals followed a FA framework; 101 charged in some way for publication). Only 135 (40.7%) of the journals surveyed demanded that submissions comply with a pre-defined ethical stance. FA journals are just as likely to have an ethical policy on the treatment and presentation of animal studies as ‘traditional’, non-FA journals (significance of there being a difference: P = 0.98), and there is no relationship between policy and whether an author is required to pay for publication (significance of there being a difference: P = 0.57). Older journals are more likely to have an ethical policy (P = 0.03). There is, therefore, no obvious compromise shown by FA journals in the explicit policies on reporting studies involving animals. However, since anyone can read published FA studies online, FA journals that do not have an explicit policy about publishing animal research are urged to consider adopting one.