Literature highlights the distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking as a prominent cognitive style distinction, leading to the proposal of various theories within the framework of the dual process model. However, it remains unclear whether individuals differ in their thinking styles along a single dimension, from intuitive to analytic, or if other dimensions are at play. Moreover, the presence of numerous thinking style measures, employing different terminology but conceptually overlapping, leads to confusion. To address these complexities, Newton et al. suggested the idea that individuals vary across multiple dimensions of intuitive–analytic thinking styles and distinguished thinking styles between 4 distinct types: Actively open-minded thinking, close-minded thinking, preference for effortful thinking, and preference for intuitive thinking. They proposed a new measure for this 4-factor disposition, The 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire (4-CTSQ), to comprehensively capture the psychological outcomes related to thinking styles; however, no independent test exists. In the current pre-registered studies, we test the validity of 4-CTSQ for the first time beyond the original study and examine the association of the proposed measure with various factors, including morality, conspiracy beliefs, paranormal and religious beliefs, vaccine hesitancy, and ideology in an underrepresented culture, Türkiye. We found that the correlated 4-factor model of 4-CTSQ is an appropriate measure to capture individual differences based on cognitive style. The results endorse the notion that cognitive style differences are characterized by distinct structures rather than being confined to two ends of a single continuum.

A substantial body of evidence suggests that favoring reason over intuition (employing an analytic cognitive style) is associated with reduced belief in God. In the current work, we address outstanding issues in this literature with two studies examining the relationship between analytic cognitive style (as measured by performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test) and belief in God. First, prior research focused on Judeo-Christian cultures, and it is uncertain whether the results generalize to other religious systems or beliefs. Study 1 helps to address this question by documenting a negative correlation between CRT performance and belief in God, r = −.18, in a sample of 513 participants from India, a majority Hindu country. Second, among 150 participants from the United Kingdom, Gervais et al. (2018) reported the first and (to date) only evidence for a positive relationship between CRT and belief in God. In Study 2, we assess the robustness of this result by recruiting 547 participants from the United Kingdom. Unlike Gervais et al., using the same items, we find a negative correlation between CRT and belief in God (r = −.19). Our results add further support to the argument that analytic thinking undermines belief in God.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, French public opinion has been divided about Pr. Didier Raoult and his hydroxychloroquine-based treatment against COVID-19. In this paper, our aim is to contribute to the understanding of this polarization of public opinion by investigating the relationship between (analytic vs. intuitive) cognitive style and trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Through three studies (total N after exclusion = 950), we found that a more intuitive cognitive style predicted higher trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Moreover, we found that Trust in Raoult was positively associated with belief that truth is political, belief in conspiracy theories, belief in pseudo-medicines and pseudo-medical and conspiratorial beliefs regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We also found a negative association with knowledge of scientific methods and regard for scientific method over personal experience. However, higher trust in Didier Raoult was not associated with self-reported compliance with official regulations concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.

Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.