The legal treatment of autonomous algorithmic collusion in light of its technical feasibility and various theoretical considerations is an important issue because autonomous algorithmic collusion raises difficult questions concerning the attribution of conduct by algorithms to firms and reopens the longstanding debate about the legality of tacit collusion. Algorithmic collusion, namely, direct communication between algorithms, which amounts to express collusion, is illegal. Intelligent and independent adaptation to competitors’ conduct by algorithms with no direct communication between them, which is tacit collusion, is generally legal. There should be ex ante regulation to reduce algorithmic collusion.

The chapter aims to serve as a conceptual sketch for the intricacies involved in autonomous algorithmic collusion, including the notion of concerted practices for cases that would otherwise elude the cartel prohibition. Stefan Thomas, a law scholar, starts by assessing how algorithms can influence competition in markets before dealing with the traditional criteria of distinction between explicit and tacit collusion, which might reveal a potential gap in the existing legal framework regarding algorithmic collusion. Finally, he analyses whether the existing cartel prohibition can be construed in a way that captures the phenomenon appropriately. This chapter shows how enforcement paradigms that hinge on descriptions of the inner sphere and conduct of human beings may collapse when applied to the effects precipitated by independent AI based computer agents.

The concluding chapter argues that the Asian leniency programmes only converge on the core elements of a leniency programme. The core elements are the building blocks of a leniency programme. However, the composition of these blocks is often different. Some of the differences are subtle. Other differences make the respective leniency programme distinct from the others. Some of the distinctive elements are not necessarily part of the building blocks any more and thus give a unique character to the respective leniency programme. This chapter further claims that these differences can be explained by either the political economy of a country, experimentation due to prior negative enforcement results and a desire to achieve better enforcement results, or foreign influence. Since the result of experimentation cannot always be predicted, the authors estimate that further amendments will be made to the Asian leniency programmes.