This chapter discusses general principles of liability as they apply across the various offences and provide for the doctrines by which a person may commit, participate in, or otherwise be found responsible for those crimes. They include forms of liability such as aiding and abetting, which are familiar to all domestic criminal lawyers, as well as principles like command responsibility, which are specific to international criminal law.

This chapter first examines the situation of terrorism in the present world with the conclusion that without financial support, terrorist warfare and activities could not be sustained for very long. Next, the chapter addresses the 1999 Financing Terrorism Convention. In addition to the commission (provision or collection) of the offences defined in the Convention, Article 2(5) requires the criminalization of other activities, such as attempts, the participation as an accomplice in a defined offence, the organization of such an offence, or direction of others to commit such an offence as well as the intentional contribution to the commission of such an offence by a group acting with a common purpose, under certain defined circumstances. The chapter goes on to conduct a comparative study of the various modes of participation taking into account the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and other international/ised criminal tribunals. It is suggested that all the activities listed in Article 2(5) of the Financing Terrorism Convention, except attempt, be regarded as modes of liability rather than inchoate crimes.

From Yemen to Rwanda, Sierra Leone to Cambodia, it has often been claimed that those who supply the weapons that are used to commit genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity play a role in bringing about those crimes. An arms trader who knowingly fuels atrocity may be considered morally reprehensible, but is he or she criminally responsible? Modes of accomplice liability in international criminal law prohibit the conduct of individuals involved in the arms trade who assist in the commission of international crimes. However, international criminal tribunals have heard only a small number of cases involving commercial arms transfers. This Chapter examines how the ICC could fit into the existing regulatory landscape of arms transfer conduct in the future, in particular through its mandate to enforce the mode of liability in Article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute.

Charles Taylor was President of Liberia between 1997 and 2003, trader in arms, timber and minerals and initiator of the first phase of the Liberian civil war. He is currently serving a fifty year prison sentence for his involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. This chapter examines how the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) established the linkage between Taylor as a high level economic actor in Liberia and international crimes in neighbouring Sierra Leone through modes of liability, in particular aiding and abetting. Further, in view of Taylor's position as head of State for most of the period covered by the SCSL indictment and the nature of groups such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), issues of State and organizational responsibility are addressed, including the reasons for prioritising individual criminal responsibility. Finally, the chapter considers the findings and recommendations of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission concerning the role of economic actors and economic activities in contributing to, and benefiting from the armed conflict in Liberia.

While international criminal law contains intricate rules regarding aiding and abetting, this specific body of law fails to elaborate on the ways in which one may aid or abet. This chapter first provides an overview of the relevant legal rules and the international case law regarding aiding and abetting. Next these rules are applied to funders of wars who provide financial support to a party to an armed conflict, in order to evaluate whether these funders can be held accountable as aiders and abettors. While individuals may be held responsible at the international level as aiders and abettors, companies themselves currently cannot. However, numerous individual States have enacted legislation to enable their domestic courts to determine corporate criminal liability in certain cases. This chapter therefore enquires whether domestic judicial systems can contribute effectively to the achievement of accountability when faced with cases involving companies having aided and abetted the principal perpetrator of an international crime.

When the protracted Syrian conflict eventually comes to an end and transitional justice in its many manifestations is properly operationalized, a test case for the prosecution of economic actors under international criminal law may emerge. The evidence of international crimes in Syria has been documented and subjected to scrutiny and analysis since the start of the conflict in 2011, by the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and domestic investigative bodies. This chapter examines investigative approaches towards uncovering the role of economic actors alleged to have facilitated international crimes attributed to the Syrian regime. The work of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) and the limitations of the CIJA model in investigating international crimes of an economic nature are first explained before outlining the applicable jurisprudential framework with reference to customary international law. The chapter proceeds to examine how economic actors who are engaged in activities in Syria during the conflict might be held to account in law where they are suspected of the perpetration of core international crimes.

This chapter focuses on the actus reus for aiding and abetting liability, to be more specific: the standard of causation, in the context of companies and businessmen who contribute to mass atrocities. It will do so through the lens of two well-known Dutch cases, concerning two businessmen, Mr. Van Anraat and Mr. Kouwenhoven, who delivered weapons in situations of armed conflict and mass atrocities (Iraq in the 1980s and Liberia in the 1990s). While both men have been convicted for aiding and abetting war crimes, the requisite standard of contribution appears to differ considerably between the two cases. This chapter addresses the question as to what the degree of causation should be for aiding and abetting liability of companies and businessmen who have assisted in the commission of mass atrocities. This question is answered in the context of aiding and abetting in Dutch domestic criminal law and international criminal law.