Constitutional courts play an essential role in authoritatively interpreting constitutions. Oftentimes they go beyond the constitutional text by inventing so-called judge-made law. Their authority to interpret the text covers not only substantive parts but also the clause authorizing their jurisdiction. Such power, namely the power to interpret the limits of their jurisdiction, is often used to intervene in the interpretation of the constitution more vigorously than explicitly authorized. One example is the invention, designation, and development of the advisory jurisdiction by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. On that basis, the Court has, for almost ten years of its existence, pronounced on numerous fundamental issues relating to the governing system, power maps, and entitlements on political authority. The Court developed its advisory jurisdiction in a rather unpredictable and impulsive fashion; however, it steadily revealed its willingness to engage with interpretations that sought to resolve high-stakes issues. Such braveness also had a credibility cost for the Court. The year 2018 marked a major shift in the Court’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction to “advise.” In the Central Election Commission case, it abandoned its previous precedent and commenced a passive, restrained attitude in engaging with the constitutional interpretation on the basis of case or controversy. This Article analyzes the Court’s path and change of course in this cycle.

This contribution examines access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the first decade of its operation. Compared with other regional human rights Courts over the corresponding period, the African Court has decided more contentious cases. Direct access accounts for this difference. Acceptance by States of optional direct access is a necessary but insufficient condition for actual access. The reasons for the Commission's reluctance to refer cases, which hampered indirect access to the Court, are investigated. Although the Court's advisory jurisdiction has found limited application, it has welcomed amici curiae and showed some acceptance of the role of original complainants before the Court.

In the Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was called upon to clarify the existence of its advisory jurisdiction as a full Tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ITLOS unanimously upheld its advisory jurisdiction, yet its reasoning is not convincing. ITLOS’s interpretation of Article 21 of its Statute appears unpersuasive. The article discusses the interpretation of Article 21 ITLOS Statute pursuant to the rules on interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Arts. 31–33). First, the article addresses the article's textual reading, and criticizes the Tribunal's interpretation of the term ‘matters’. Second, the article considers the interpretation of Article 21 according to the subsequent practice of the parties, argued by some states but not addressed by ITLOS. Third, the travaux préparatoires of the UNCLOS are examined, with a view to understanding whether the drafters intended the Tribunal to have advisory jurisdiction. Fourth, the six authentic texts of UNCLOS are compared in order to highlight potential differences that may help understand the exact meaning of the provision. Fifth, the article discusses the relationship between advisory jurisdiction and state consent. The conclusion is that the basis for ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction under UNCLOS seems weak. Some general considerations conclude the article, together with a possible solution that takes stock of ITLOS's decision.

On 2 April 2015, the full International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rendered its first advisory opinion in reply to a request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission regarding illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Unlike any other court or tribunal with advisory competence, including the Seabed Disputes Chamber, ITLOS’ advisory jurisdiction is not explicitly enshrined in its constituent instrument, but was rather asserted in the Tribunal’s, homemade, rules of procedure. In spite of strong objections from various states, ITLOS affirmed a broad advisory jurisdiction ratione materiae and personae, and found that there were no compelling reasons to exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the request. The request and the Tribunal's handling thereof raise interesting questions regarding the opportunities and risks inherent to, and the outer limits of, the advisory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. This contribution takes a look at the advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal, having regard to the experiences of other international courts and tribunals.

On April 2, 2015, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS or Tribunal) rendered an advisory opinion on the rights and obligations of flag states and coastal states regarding illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). ITLOS confirmed that the full Tribunal—not just its Seabed Disputes Chamber—has jurisdiction to render advisory opinions, a matter of controversy that had previously been untested. The Tribunal also held that under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or Convention), flag states have a “due diligence” obligation to ensure that vessels flying their flag do not engage in IUU fishing activities, and that the flag state may be held liable if that obligation of due diligence is breached. In addition, the Tribunal clarified that where fisheries competence has been transferred from a state to an international organization, it is the organization, not the flag state, that may face liability for a failure to have taken adequate measures to prevent IUU fishing. Finally, the Tribunal confirmed that coastal states have a duty to consult and cooperate with each other in the sustainable management of shared stocks and highly migratory species.

This article offers an analytical overview of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the establishment of an African human rights court, which entered into force in January 2004. The article seeks to answer the questions of whether and, if so, to what extent the Protocol strengthens the African human rights protection system.