This paper investigates the development of conventions of trust in what we call intergenerational games, i.e., games played by a sequence of non-overplapping agents, who pass on advice on how to play the game across adjacent generations of players. Using the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) as our experimental decision problem, advice seems to decrease the amount of trust that evolves when this game in played in an inter-generational manner in that it decreases the amount of money sent from Senders to Returners. Ironically, advice increases trustworthiness in that Returners tend to send more back. Further, subjects appear to follows conventions of reciprocity in that they tend to Send more if they think the Returners acted in a “kind” manner, where kind means the Sender sent more money than the receiver expected. Finally, while we find a causal relationship running from trustworthiness to trust, the opposite can not be established. We note that many of our results can only be achieved using the tools offered by inter-generational games. The inter-generational advice offered provides information not available when games are played in their static form. Combining that information with elicited beliefs of the Senders and Returners adds even more information that can be used to investigate the motives that subjects have for doing what they do.

In many market environments, for example in investment banking, salesforce management and others, workers and supervisors work closely as a team. Workers are paid a fixed salary and supervisors determine any raises, which are typically dependent on how well the organization does. In such scenarios, a supervisor who constantly offers suggestions can create a problem—typically a worker cannot ignore his supervisor's advice, yet if such advice is wrong and is followed, it will only decrease firm profits. We conduct a laboratory experiment to address a question critical for such settings—does the relationship between advisor and worker interfere with the learning abilities of the worker? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, subjects who have a supervisor advising them and whose advice is costly to ignore actually learn better than those with an advisor whose advice can be ignored. An even more striking result is that advisees as well as advisors in both these conditions learn better than subjects with no advisors. Our result can be attributed to the presence of advice and has direct relevance to learning in many environments.

We augment a standard bilateral gift exchange game so employees can send messages at the same time as choosing an effort level. Employee effort (controlling for wages) is unaffected by allowing messages, but wages dramatically increase. Messages affect wages because employees give managers advice to set higher wages, usually explaining that this will result in higher effort. This advice prompts managers to try higher wages, helping them learn that raising wages increases their payoffs. In a follow-up experiment, we directly provide managers with additional information about the relationship between wages and effort. This too causes wages to increase, but to a lesser extent than allowing messages. Our results highlight the critical role of learning in generating gains from positive gift exchange.

There is substantial evidence that the decisions of experienced and inexperienced agents differ in ways that impact both individual earnings and aggregate market outcomes. Typically, such evidence is gathered by studying experience as it accumulates within subjects over time. We examine a new question; whether behaviors associated with experience can be transferred directly to new market participants. Specifically, we study the intergenerational transmission of information, including direct advice, in experimental asset markets. Empirical results suggest that advice is a substitute for experience. Prices in sessions with advised traders shift towards fundamentals—a pattern consonant with prior work exploring the impact of own-experience on pricing dynamics. Further, convergence is observed in mixed-markets where only a subset of traders are advised.

We present an experimental design where uncertainty is generated from the advice of experts with conflicts of interest. In this experiment clients are faced with a variant of a multi-armed bandit problem with a random end-time. On the known arm (the “task screen”), clients can earn a certain payment per completion of a decoding task. However, clients may also opt for the unknown arm where they earn an uncertain amount if they end the experiment on this “expert screen”. The amount is uncertain to the clients because the value is being communicated through an “expert” with conflicted incentives. A control session provides for direct transmission of the value to the clients. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is alive-and-well in this environment. Also, when we vary the wage rate on the known arm we find that higher opportunity cost clients are less likely to heed the advice of conflicted experts.

Research on advice taking has demonstrated a phenomenon of egocentric discounting: people weight their own estimates more than advice from others. However, this research is mostly conducted in highly controlled lab settings with low or no stakes. We used unique data from a game show on Norwegian television to investigate advice taking in a high stakes and highly public setting. Parallel to the standard procedure in judge–advisor systems studies, contestants give numerical estimates for several tasks and solicit advice (another estimate) from three different sources during the game. The average weight of advice was 0.58, indicating that contestants weighted advice more than their own estimates. Of potential predictors of weight of advice, we did not detect associations with the use of intuition (e.g., gut feeling, guessing) and advice source (family, celebrities, average of viewers from hometown), but own estimation success (the proportion of previous rounds won) was associated with less weight of advice. Solicitation of advice was associated with higher stakes. Together with the relatively high weight on advice, this suggests that participants considered the advice valuable. On average, estimates did not improve much after advice taking, and the potential for improvement by averaging estimates and advice was negligible. We discuss different factors that could contribute to these findings, including stakes, solicited versus unsolicited advice, task difficulty, and high public scrutiny. The results suggest that highly controlled lab studies may not give an accurate representation of advice taking in high stakes and highly public settings.

We present experimental results from a web-based study on the speech act of giving advice in French. 86 L1 speakers of French had to continue short and written fictitious interactions we created, in which we manipulated the adviser’s level of experience (explicitly experienced, explicitly inexperienced, or no precision) and the hierarchical relationship between adviser and advisee (top-down, bottom-up, and equals). Participants had to choose between four types of continuations, from indirect strategies to direct prototypical imperative strategies, with variations of the face-threatening value in some continuations, as per Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory. Main results from Bayesian regression analyses indicate an overall preference for indirect strategies in French, but also suggest influences from the level of experience and hierarchical relationship. These results will allow for a better understanding of advice as a speech act and contribute to a growing body of work in experimental pragmatics.

One of the key responsibilities of public institutions in liberal democracies is to formulate recommendations for decision makers. However, public institutions realize that decision makers will often partly ignore their recommendations. This situation of “partial compliance” with recommendations raises a number of philosophical issues for institutions. Based on an analysis of 570 recommendations drawn from 40 Quebec public-sector documents and reports, we identify two issues surrounding the structure of public-policy recommendations.

Six experiments investigated how the distance between one’s initial opinion and advice relates to advice utilization. Going beyond previous research, we relate advice distance to both relative adjustments and absolute adjustments towards the advice, and we also investigate a second mode of advice utilization, namely confidence shifts due to social validation.Whereas previous research suggests that advice is weighted less the more it differs from one’s initial opinion, we consistently find evidence of a curvilinear pattern. Advice is weighted less when advice distance is low and when it is high. This is in particular because individuals are much more likely to retain their initial opinions in the light of near advice. Also, absolute opinion adjustments towards the advice increases in a monotone fashion as advice distance increases. This finding is in contrast to the predictions of the theoretical framework previous studies on advice distance are based on, social judgment theory. Instead, they data are more in line with a simple stimulus-response model suggesting that absolute adjustments towards the advice increase with advice distance but—potentially—with diminished sensitivity. Finally, our data show that advice can be utilized even when it receives zero weight during belief revision. The closer advice was to the initial opinions, the more it served as a means for social validation, increasing decision-makers’ confidence in the accuracy of their final opinions. Thus, our findings suggest that advice utilization is a more complex function of advice distance than previously assumed.

Animal welfare is multidimensional; its assessment relies on complementary measures covering all dimensions. Welfare Quality® constructed a multicriteria evaluation model for its assessment at unit level (farms, slaughterhouses). Four welfare principles are distinguished (‘Good feeding’, ‘Good housing’, ‘Good health’, and ‘Appropriate behaviour’). An animal unit receives four principle scores (expressed on a 0-100 value scale). These scores are aggregated together to form the overall assessment by sorting animal units into predefined welfare categories boundaried by reference profiles. A unit is assigned to the welfare category above the profile it is considered at least as good as. Several assignment procedures were tested on a set of 69 dairy farms and compared with observers’ general impressions. The welfare categories, reference profiles and assignment procedure were defined in consultation with social scientists, animal scientists and stakeholders. Four welfare categories were defined: ‘Excellent’, ‘Enhanced’, ‘Acceptable’, and ‘Not classified’. The reference profiles were set at 80, 55 and 20, corresponding to aspiration values for Excellent, Enhanced and Acceptable. The assignment procedure resulted from a compromise between theoretical opinion on what should be considered excellent, enhanced or acceptable, and what can realistically be achieved in practice: to be assigned to a given category, a unit must reach its aspiration value on 2 or 3 of the 4 principles, and not score below the aspiration value for the next lowest category on the other principle(s). The model can be used for several purposes, including identifying welfare problems on a farm to advise farmers, or checking compliance with certification schemes.

According to Siegrist, Earle and Gutscher’s (2003) model of risk communication, the effect of advice about risk on an agent’s behavior depends on the agent’s trust in the competence of the advisor and on their trust in the motives of the advisor. Trust in competence depends on how good the advice received from the source has been in the past. Trust in motives depends on how similar the agent assesses the advisor’s values to be to their own. We show that past quality of advice and degree of similarity between advisors’ and judges’ values have separate (non-interacting) effects on two types of agent behavior: the degree of trust expressed in a source (stated trust) and the weight given to the source’s advice (revealed trust). These findings support Siegrist et al.’s model. We also found that revealed trust was affected more than stated trust by differences in advisor quality. It is not clear how this finding should be accommodated within Siegrist et al.’s (2003) model.