This chapter argues that because judging inevitably requires the exercise of judgment, one of our most critical concerns should be ensuring that the people we select as judges have good judgment. It explores what good judgment might mean and draws on work in both law and philosophy exploring the nature of judicial character. It further explores two components of judicial character, specifically practical wisdom and intellectual humility, and in the case of the latter, surveys a growing body of work in philosophy and psychology that investigates humility’s nature and benefits. It briefly outlines ways in which a renewed emphasis on judicial character might be implemented.

Normative ethics is divided between ethical theory and practical ethics. Three families of ethical theories are consequentialism, virtue ethics, and Kantianism. Consequentialism is the view that consequences determine what we ought to do. Virtue ethics is the view that right actions should be understood in terms of virtuous agents and their character. Kantianism’s central concern is with how rational agents ought to relate to themselves and to each other. Ethical theory is difficult to disentangle from practical ethics, which is concerned with what we ought to do in particular situations, which – along with the question “How should I live?” – is the most important topic in ethics and perhaps all of philosophy.

This chapter explores the connection between ethics and mindful leadership in education by situating the discussion within the tradition of moral and ethical leadership. Drawing on virtue ethics, the concept of virtuous mindful leadership is proposed. This leadership construct refers to the present-moment attention to self, people, and events that reflects the leader’s moral character. This form of leadership transcends a leader’s obligation to adhere to moral rules or ensure good outcomes to the leader’s ethics, conduct, and role-modeling. A virtuous, mindful leader contributes to human flourishing by helping others to achieve eudaemonic well-being. In educational administration, such a leader creates and sustains a school culture of authentic mindfulness, promotes social justice education, and supports mindful collaboration with staff.

This chapter considers the major Abrahamic faiths on a continuum from dynamic to dogmatic. On the dynamic side lies the God of covenant and a life consistent with an open society. On the dogmatic side lies the ruler of the universe and a life aligned with a closed society. Readings of Abraham’s story leaning toward the dynamic end of this continuum are more authentic than those tending toward the dogmatic end. Dynamic readings of Abraham’s legacy are also more ethically robust and their transmission more genuinely educational, conceived as initiation into intelligent worldviews while learning from and about alternatives. This dialogical concept of education, called the “pedagogy of difference,” can lead us out of our current morass in which people of deep difference are increasingly incapable of communicating with one another.

This chapter conceptualises the Confucian legal tradition as a historically extended and legally embodied Confucian argument. The Confucian legal tradition has three features. First, it is jurisprudentially founded on a set of Confucian concepts and principles justifying the importance of good men. Second, the Confucian argument is embodied in structural institutions and legal codes in premodern and modern East Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam). Third, legally embodied Confucian concepts and principles are historically extended for thousands of years from formation, consolidation, and transnationalisation to modernisation.

Worldviews are defined as combinations of value orientations and belief systems. Both are an inevitable part of the sustainability disourse. Both can be correlated to the worldview dimensions (previous chapter). Values are empirically explored through surveys; several value categories have been proposed. Beliefs tend to be linked to values; they are difficult to explore empirically. Important beliefs have to do with the place of humans in Nature, the roots of good and evil, the role of human ingenuity, the constraints of the collective on the individual, and the balance between coordination and competition. Throughout the sustainability discourse, ethical questions about how to reconcile individual desires with what is considered collectively desirable emerge. I consider here briefly the roots and critique of Modernity ethics, and discuss some alternative and new ethical positions (virtue ethics, development and eco-spiritual ethics).

Chapter seven has two tasks. First, it summarizes the argument and the broad themes of the book. Second, it discusses the character of modernity. My argument is that we should view modernity as a distinct civilization, rather than as a period. This civilization is caught in a complex interplay and tension between the confrontation with uncertainty and the strivings for certainty, unfortunately often conceptualized as ontological absolutes. Although ontologies of uncertainty and certainty are co-constitutive, our culture tends to see the world in either–or terms, which explains the tendency to oscillation between hubris and despair and the difficulty of pragmatic and balanced accounts to enter into mainstream world views. Third, I propose a modest remedy for these modernist tendencies: namely, drawing inspiration from non-dualist traditions and classical virtue ethics.

Engaging in normative discussions about the characteristics and requirements of a good life in a good society, Political Philosophy has a long-standing history in identifying the economic, political and social requirements for turning waged work into a practice that contributes to human flourishing. Meanwhile, a widely shared scepticism towards meaningful work under capitalism is another powerful theme in the field, arguing that the alienating nature of waged work cannot be overcome. This chapter argues that contributions to meaningful work in the realm of Political Philosophy have a strong tendency to incorporate both positions, presenting an ambivalent understanding of wage labour as activity that is burdensome and alienating for the many and emancipatory and meaningful for the few. Discussing two of the most significant schools of thought in this field, virtue ethics and political materialist contributions, the chapter identifies and compares their ontological understandings of work and its nature under capitalism, the conceptualisation of labour agency and the guiding principles of meaningful work that they promote.

This chapter discusses international law in context: how it relates to its political environment as well as to ethical concerns, and how the ethics of individual agents may be of relevance

In De Officiis, Cicero undertakes sustained engagement with Roman exemplary ethics. He uses dozens of different exempla to serve a variety of functions including as inspirational paradigms as means of illustrating abstract concepts and to communicate the important principle of situational variation. In addition he reflects upon some of the challenges of exemplary ethics when viewed within the Stoic context and also develops new techniques for utilising exempla and exemplary modes within a Stoic framework. He achieves this partly by incorporating into his philosophical discussion some key features of Roman exemplary ethics including a sense of particularity and historical specificity emotional charge and injunction and indeterminacy. De Officiis anticipates to some extent ideas later developed more explicitly by Seneca; identifying these enables us to better appreciate the unfolding dialogue between Stoicism and exemplary ethics.

Cicero’s De Officiis is the only surviving extended Stoic-style treatment of practical deliberation, offering guidance on what counts as well-judged decision-making. This chapter explores two questions raised by this feature of the work: (1) what is the general form of Stoic thinking on valid practical deliberation? (2) how far does Cicero’s De Officiis reflect the Stoic view of deliberation? On the first question, after considering recent scholarly discussions which stress the importance for Stoic deliberation of gaining advantages (‘preferable indifferents’), the chapter highlights the relevance for Stoic thought of a modern virtue ethical treatment of deliberation, which stresses the criterial role of virtue. On the second question, the chapter brings out how the structure and argumentation of De Officiis reflect the Stoic conception of deliberation, as presented here (that is, as centred on virtue).