Motivated by distributional concerns raised by recent breakthroughs in AI and robotics, we ask how workers would prefer to manage an episode of automation in a task-based model, which distinguishes between automation and traditional technical progress. We show that under majority voting with the option to implement a “partial” UBI (as transfers to workers) it is optimal to tax capital at a higher rate than labor in the long run to fund the partial UBI. We show that, unlike traditional technical progress, automation always lowers the labor share in the long run, justifying distributional concerns. A quantitative analysis of an episode of automation for the US economy shows that it is optimal from the workers’ perspective to lower capital taxes and transfers over the transition. Nevertheless, this policy increases worker welfare by only 0.7% in consumption-equivalent terms, compared with a 21.6% welfare gain to entrepreneurs, because the welfare gains to workers from lower capital taxes are second-order, while the gains to entrepreneurs are first-order.

Elvira Basevich, Martin Sticker, and Helga Varden offered generative criticism of my monograph, Kant’s Theory of Labour. In this response, I explore how the resources they offer for thinking about gender, labour, and the state’s responsibility to ensure the material conditions of freedom can deepen both our attentiveness to patterns of systemic injustice in Kant’s political philosophy, and the resources Kant offers for addressing contemporary patterns of intersectional and material injustice.

I respond to a challenge raised by Jordan Pascoe: Kant’s conception of obtaining full citizenship through working oneself up necessarily condemns some people to passive citizenship. I argue that we should not focus on work to establish universal full citizenship. Rather, a Universal Basic Income, an income paid regularly to everyone and without conditions, can secure everyone’s full citizenship. Moreover, I argue that such a scheme is more Kantian in nature than hitherto assumed.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, governments were mainly relaying on pre-pandemic policies when introducing changes to social policies. However, the crisis did lead to transformative action as well. In this article, we explored the novel direct payments, delivered beyond existing social risk categories such as unemployment or sickness. Our exploration demonstrates that most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries did not introduce novel payments. Exceptions were Australia, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Japan, Spain, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Seven countries also continued and modified payments while the crisis continued. All the novel direct payments met some of the characteristics of universal basic income (UBI). The idea of universality was realised in Japan and South Korea. The key findings of this study suggest that the COVID-19-related novel direct payments were primarily emergency benefits for people affected by the pandemic and interpreted as quasi-basic income in times of crisis.

We compare two welfare programs: the universal basic income (UBI) and negative income tax (NIT). Under a linear income tax system, we show that (i) the NIT can replicate the allocation of the UBI exactly by providing an identical marginal effective tax schedule, and (ii) the budget of the NIT is always smaller than that of the UBI. According to our quantitative model, which is calibrated to approximate the income and wealth distributions in the United States, the optimal UBI is to pay everyone 7.2% of the average income. We also show that the NIT can achieve a similar average welfare with a much smaller budget (2.3% of the GDP) by providing a subsidy that is generous to the very poor and quickly phases out as income increases.

Does a universal basic income (UBI) affect voter turnout? This article argues that the introduction of an unconditional cash payment—where citizens receive money independent of employment status, age, or indigence—can have a turnout-enhancing effect. I evaluate the argument using the introduction of the Permanent Fund Dividend in Alaska. Differences-in-differences estimates covering November general elections from 1978 to 2000 provide compelling evidence that the Alaskan UBI has a significant positive effect on turnout. The results further suggest that the turnout increase was not a one-off effect but persists over a period of almost 20 years. Thus, a UBI has the potential to positively affect turnout among an entire electorate, adding to the discussion around potential welfare reforms in western democracies.

Public health measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic have disrupted welfare regimes around the world. The Australian government suspended activation requirements for millions of social security clients and substantially increased payment levels. Both measures go against the dominant policy logic over the past several decades in Australian social policy. When these changes were made, many advocates and academics called for a permanent increase in the rate of payment and a relaxation of activations requirements. The Australian Government insisted the stimulus package was temporary and that there would be a gradual return to the pre-pandemic policy settings. In this article, we examine what was learned during this natural experiment of unconditional higher payments, which temporarily lifted millions of households out of poverty. We argue that a return to pre-pandemic policy settings should not go unchecked as there remains an opportunity to consider alternative approaches to the welfare-work nexus in Australia.

The universal basic income (UBI) has found its way into public debates and has prominent advocates across almost all political camps. In many debates, it is presented as a solution for the consequences of a large variety of current societal challenges, such as unemployment, over-education, ecological crises, gender inequality and issues related to digitalization and automatization. While UBI has been discussed broadly from an expert position, we know very little about the population’s perceptions of UBI. Thus, to shed light on the public legitimacy of UBI as a radically different concept of social justice and citizenship, our contribution uses data from large group discussions where participants explicitly refer to the UBI as an option for a future welfare state. By comparing debates in Slovenia and Germany, we unearth that the perspective adopted by the participants towards a UBI is strongly shaped by the welfare institutions of the countries in which they live and the social justice principles embodied in those institutions.

Few studies to date have analysed individual support for universal basic income (UBI). This article theorizes and explores empirically the relationship between different strands of left ideology and support for UBI across European countries. We delineate three types of concerns about capitalism: “Labourist Left” worry about exploitation; “Libertarian Left” about repression and “Social Investment Left” about inefficiencies. Contrary to expectations we derive from political theory and welfare state literature, our results based on data from the European Social Survey suggest that having high concerns about exploitation is positively correlated with support for UBI, whereas repression concerns are negatively correlated with support. In line with our hypothesis about social investment ideology, left-leaning individuals with efficiency concerns are more likely to support UBI. Our findings call for more detailed surveys as well as further research on the different ideologies within the Left and how these relate to variation in support for UBI, which crucially shapes the potential political coalition behind the introduction of UBI.

The idea of universal basic income (UBI) has been attracting increasing attention globally over recent years. However, research on the individual and institutional determinants of UBI support is scarce. The present study attempts to fills this gap by analysing workers’ attitudes towards UBI schemes in 21 European welfare states and focusing on the roles of precarious work (i.e. part-time work, temporary employment, low-skilled service employment, and solo self-employment) and unemployment benefit generosity (i.e. net replacement rate, payment duration, and qualifying period). We estimate fixed and random effects logistic models by merging country-level institutional data with the European Social Survey Round 8 data collected in 2016. The findings show that temporary employment is associated with positive attitudes towards UBI schemes, whereas other types of precarious work do not have significant influences. In addition, the results reveal that the more generous a country’s unemployment benefits, the less likely are workers in that country to support UBI schemes.