Enforced disappearance is one of the most horrific crimes of our time. This is a crime that causes excruciating suffering to its victims: the disappeared and their families and relatives. Thousands of people have suffered, and are still suffering, all over the world from enforced disappearances. To combat this scourge, a United Nations Convention was adopted in 2006 and entered into force in 2010. It adopted a definition of enforced disappearance that includes an important element: the direct or indirect involvement of the State Party in the commission of the enforced disappearance. Yet, private entities (commonly referred to as non-State actors) can also commit acts similar to enforced disappearances. However, in the absence of the element of the State Party’s involvement, can we go so far as to qualify the acts perpetrated by non-State actors as enforced disappearances? This question has generated and continues to generate an interesting debate.

This Article comparatively analyses how the prohibition of refoulement is interpreted by United Nations Treaty Bodies (UNTBs) in their individual decision-making, where we suggest they act as “soft courts.” It asks whether UNTBs break ranks with or follow the interpretations of non-refoulement of the European Court of Human Rights. This investigation is warranted because non-refoulement is the single most salient issue that has attracted individual views from UNTBs since 1990. Moreover, our European focus is warranted as nearly half of the cases concern states that are also parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. Based on a multi-dimensional analysis of non-refoulement across an original dataset of over 500 UNTB non-refoulement cases, decided between 1990–2020, as well as pertinent UNTB General Comments, the Article finds that whilst UNTBs, at times, do adopt a more progressive position than their “harder” regional counterpart, there are also instances where they closely follow the interpretations of the European Court of Human Rights and, on occasion, adopt a more restrictive position. This analysis complicates the view that soft courts are likely to be more progressive interpreters than hard courts. It further shows that variations in the interpretation of non-refoulement in a crowded field of international interpreters present risks for evasion of accountability, whereby domestic authorities in Europe may favor the more convenient interpretation, particularly in environments hostile to non-refoulement.