This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the War of Attrition, a conflict between Israel and Egypt that lasted from 1967 to 1970. The chapter explores the political and social processes triggered by the war, as well as the significant involvement of the Soviet Union and increased US aid to Israel. It also delves into the limited scope of the war, with both sides aiming for a strategy of exhaustion The chapter highlights the role of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in shaping the country’s military strategy during the war. Dayan’s advocated for Israeli concessions and partial settlement with Egypt, arguing that the opening and reconstruction of the Suez Canal could generate positive dynamics for promoting peace. Another aspect is the social impact of the war on Israeli society, revealing the emergence of cracks in the national consensus. The war was long-lasting and resulted in heavy losses, leading to discontent and criticism from various levels of society. Despite this, the war ultimately demonstrated Israel’s military strength and ability to withstand pressure from a much larger opponent.

The chapter provides a detailed account of the decision-making processes that led to strategic surprise in the Yom Kippur War 6 of October 1973 and the battles during the first days of the war. The chapter highlights the differences in opinion among Israeli military leaders regarding the best approach to defending against an Egyptian attack, with some advocating for a flexible defense and others favoring a rigid defense with strongpoints. Ultimately, political considerations led to the adoption of a rigid defense strategy integrated with some mobile units. The chapter also explores the misunderstandings and communication issues that occurred during the first hours of the war that led to Israel’s military failures, particularly with regards to the delayed call-up of reserve units but also the air force. Israel’s counter offensive on the 8 of October failure in its southern front is also analyzed.