The Fourth Republic is Nigeria's longest experience in democratic practice. It is a democracy founded upon the ideal of separation of powers; each branch checks the other two within defined boundaries. To act as an effective check on the political branches of government, the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, is built around structures that guarantee its independence. This article assesses the Supreme Court of Nigeria's use of discretion within this web and argues that the court now inevitably allows powerful actors to bank on its legitimacy and induce it to overstretch its competence to satisfy their individual policy and political preferences. This trend, the article finds, is antithetical to the concept of judicial independence. A court's independence is not only apparent when it is able to do what it is meant to do but also when it is able to refrain from what it is not meant to do.

International environmental law rarely refers to the rule of law. However, in fostering inter-state cooperation, international environmental agreements oblige parties to prohibit, restrict or control various activities that are harmful to the environment. The application of these constraints at the national level requires the rule of law to be taken into account.

Examining the practices of i) the selection of judges, ii) panel composition and case assignment, and iii) judicial off-bench activities, the article argues that some Czech judges, most often court presidents and apex court judges, use informal judicial institutions as tools to increase their influence on judicial administration and the decision-making of courts. As a result, these judges have far greater influence than the formal account of their roles might suggest. The article explores the context which facilitated the informal rise of these “Superjudges”, asserting that the key factors were institutionally independent judiciaries with individually dependent judges, the absence of a shared understanding of fundamental constitutional concepts, and the underperformance of Czech legal academia. The article then contends that while Superjudges may contribute to an informed, effective, and politically independent functioning of the judiciary, they also risk eroding important divisions of power which, in turn, might compromise the integrity of the judicial process, undermine the authority of courts, and disconnect the content of the law from the general interest.

The COVID-19 pandemic has made it clear that even when using trusted legal tools, courts may run into challenging problems. Governments reacted to an unprecedented (at least in the context of post-WW2 era of fundamental rights) global crisis by adopting measures that drastically limited fundamental rights in order to protect the lives and health of many. Courts, of course, were entrusted with protecting fundamental rights against governmental overreach. The question was, how strict should the courts be when reviewing governmental acts. On the one hand, they could have relied on substantive proportionality assessment. This option, however was virtually ignored and most courts have opted for a deferential approach. This article analyzes both of these approaches, their strengths and weaknesses, but ultimately it argues that a third option - semiprocedural review - is the best way out of this judicial conundrum. Relying on comparative as well as theoretical arguments, it argues that semiprocedural review is the best way to deal with challenging empirical question - even under conditions of epistemological uncertainty.

Unilateral presidential action is thought to be limited by the ability of successors to easily reverse past decisions. Yet, most executive actions are never formally revoked. We argue that because of presidents’ unique position as chief executive, some actions create outcomes that make policy reversal more difficult or even infeasible. We develop a novel measure of policies with more immutable consequences and analyze the revocation of executive orders issued between 1937 and 2021. We find the degree of outcome immutability reduces the influence of political conditions on policy revocation. We further examine these dynamics in three cases in which presidents have substantial discretion – diplomacy, non-combatant detention, and police militarization. Scholarship has long highlighted the president’s first-mover status relative to other institutional actors as a key source of their power. Collectively, our argument and evidence demonstrate this applies to their relationship with successors.

The article discusses the current legal-political crisis in Israel against the backdrop of the judicial and political powers that have led to the present situation. The disastrous Yom Kippur War of 1973 weakened the government and public confidence in the political institutions. The weaknesses of the government enabled the Supreme Court to carry out a judicial revolution, which completely changed the country's legal system. The legal revolution entered a new stage when the Supreme Court held that the Basic Laws form part of Israel's constitution. This judicially created constitution opened the way for judicial review of legislation. Its weakness stems from the fact that Basic Laws are legislated in much the same way as ordinary legislation. As a result, the Knesset can easily override any ruling of the Court that voids a statute, by amending the relevant Basic Law. The Court is now struggling to find a means of gaining some control over the legislation of Basic Laws. At the same time, the present government declared its intention to carry out legal reforms that are in effect a counter-revolution to the judicial revolution. The article examines how the fluctuation in the political support of the Court affects its decisions.

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative program to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments—for example, anti-dumping—and by adding new instruments to the European Commission’s toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument, and others), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises accountability questions. By means of a comparative analysis of democratic accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission’s growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy.

In a crisis, ordinary rules must often give way to a more expedient approach. Such emergency competences tend to favour executive decision-making over legislative procedures. In a European Union (EU) shaken by successive crises, this situation risks leading to permanent competence creep. While considerable attention has been devoted to the impact of crisis on legal and political decision-making within the Union, the position of the Court of Justice (CJEU) – and its impact on the distribution of powers within the EU – has been less researched. This Article fills the gap by exploring how the Court reviews the exercise of power in times of crisis by executive actors at the Union and Member State levels. Using migration law as a case study, it qualitatively and quantitatively examines how the CJEU has responded to crisis both in its scrutiny of measures of containment, and through its adjudication of migration cases in general before and after the acute phase of the 2015 refugee crisis. The Article shows that the crisis has led the CJEU to take a more lenient approach towards the executive powers at both the Union and the Member State level. It argues that this effectively amounts to a withdrawal from the judicial control function and enables an expansion of executive power that is likely to have effects lasting beyond any given emergency.

This introductory Article sets out the background and summarises the content of the Symposium on ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as a Relational Actor’. Observing that the CJEU has been a key player in shaping European legal integration, the Symposium takes as its starting point that courts – and the CJEU is no exception in this regard – are unable to drive developments in isolation. For the Court to carry out its role as guarantor of the Treaties and guardian of the rule of law in the Union, it needs not to isolate itself but to interact with other European Union (EU) and national institutions. Relations, the Symposium argues, are not only unavoidable but also legitimate and even vital for the adequate execution of the judicial function. This introduction briefly explores six of the Court’s most important relationships: those with the other EU institutions; the courts of the Member States; the Member States themselves; the parties appearing before it; other international courts; and the general public. It then summarises the contributions and highlights how they complement each other in examining the CJEU as a relational actor.