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This starred (omittable) chapter is devoted to non-separable versions of results already proved in the more tractable separable context. As the star indicates, the results here are aimed more at the specialist topologist than at the general mathematical reader, our usual intended audience.
I examine Aristotle’s reasons in DA I.3 for rejecting the claim that understanding (nous) is a magnitude (megethos), an idea Aristotle associates most explicitly with Plato, who describes nous as a self-moving circle in the Timaeus. Aristotle shows that his definition of soul, on which soul is not a magnitude or body of any kind, can explain perception, thought, and motion better than his predecessor’s materialist accounts. But unlike perception and motion, nous is not actualized through the body nor does it have a bodily organ, which makes nous a very different kind of soul capacity. Earlier thinkers, including Plato, already maintain that nous does not have a bodily organ, but they cannot explain how nous could operate or be a mover without being some sort of body itself. Even in the Timaeus, nous is described as being a kind of magnitude. But if nous were a magnitude of any kind, Aristotle claims it would not be able to think or reason. There is something about being a magnitude qua magnitude that makes reason impossible. His critique of Plato in I.3 prepares the way for his account of nous in DA III.4.
We study the following problem: For which Tychonoff spaces $X$ do the free topological group $F(X)$ and the free abelian topological group $A(X)$ admit a quotient homomorphism onto a separable and nontrivial (i.e., not finitely generated) group? The existence of the required quotient homomorphisms is established for several important classes of spaces $X$, which include the class of pseudocompact spaces, the class of locally compact spaces, the class of $\unicode[STIX]{x1D70E}$-compact spaces, the class of connected locally connected spaces, and some others.
We also show that there exists an infinite separable precompact topological abelian group $G$ such that every quotient of $G$ is either the one-point group or contains a dense non-separable subgroup and, hence, does not have a countable network.
If A and B are disjoint ideals on ω, there is a tower preserving σ-centered forcing which introduces a subset of ω which meets every infinite member of A in an infinite set and is almost disjoint fromeverymember of B. We can then produce a model in which all compact separable radial spaces are Fréchet, thus answering a question of P. Nyikos. The question of the existence of compact ccc radial spaces which are not Fréchet was first asked by Chertanov (see [Arh78]).
Let (S. U) be a uniform space. This space can be embedded in a complete, uniform lattice called the scale of (S. U). We prove that the scale is compact if and only if S is finite or U = {S × S}. We prove that this statement remains true if compact is replaced by countably compact, totally bounded. Lindelof, second countable, or separable. In the last section of this paper, we investigate the cardinality of the scale and the retracted scale.
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