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How do polycentric governance systems respond to new collective action problems? This Element tackles this question by studying the governance of adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. Like climate mitigation, climate adaptation has public good characteristics and therefore poses collective action problems of coordination and cooperation. The Element brings together the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework, a theory of polycentricity combining rational choice institutionalism with social network theory, to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers to coordination they perceive, the collaborative relationships they form, and their assessment of the quality of the cooperation process in the policy forums they attend. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the Element finds that polycentric governance systems can address coordination problems by fostering the emergence of leaders who reduce transaction and information costs. Polycentric systems, however, struggle to address issues of inequality and redistribution.
Climate change has been recognised as a major concern in coastal hotspots exposed to multiple climate hazards under regionally specific characteristics of vulnerability. We review the emerging research and current trends in the academic literature on coastal climate risk and adaptation from a human security perspective. The ecological and socioeconomic developments are analysed for key risk areas, including coastal infrastructure; water, food and fisheries; health; human mobility; and conflict, taking the different geographical contexts of coastal areas in islands, megacities and deltas into consideration. Compounding and cascading interactions require integrative research and policy approaches to address the growing complexity. Governance mechanisms focus on coastal management and adaptation, nature-based solutions and community-based adaptation, considering their synergies and trade-offs. This perspective allows for a holistic view on climate risks to human security and vicious circles of societal instability in coastal systems and the interconnectedness of different risk dimensions and systems necessary for sustainable and transformative adaptation solutions for the most affected coastal hotspots.
Explores how sea level rise and flooding are amplified by the design of cities, presents built environment strategies to manage flood risk, and considers issues of climate justice.
This paper explores compounding challenges for older coastal populations due to accelerated sea level rise at the nexus of physical hazard exposure and place-based socioeconomic and health considerations.
Methods:
This study applies geospatial analysis to assess the spatial distribution of older adults (age 65+) and their socioeconomic characteristics in Miami-Dade County in Florida. Next, it uses logistic regression to evaluate the socioeconomic determinants of block groups with 20% or more of residents age 65 and older at 3 feet of sea level rise compared to the other block groups in Miami-Dade.
Results:
The results show that this study area has an older population clustered in flood-prone locations along the shoreline. The block groups with more than 20% of older adults and sea level rise risk have higher homeownership and vacancy rates, a higher percentage of homes constructed before 1980, and more older individuals who live alone.
Conclusion:
This study identifies place-based compounding factors undermining the ability of older residents to adequately cope with accelerated sea level rise flooding in coastal urban locations. Namely, owning an older home in a declining neighborhood and living alone can trap older individuals in place and increase their flood risk.
This chapter defines, discusses, and evaluates local disaster planning, management, and mitigation, emphasizing the importance of local control over land planning and development. It focuses on the grass roots level where the impact of disasters is first and most ferociously felt, where lives are lost, and property is destroyed. Building on this base, it discusses why collaborative strategies should be created, especially where multijurisdictional issues are involved and where local expertise and resources are insufficient to respond to the full scope of the problem. To this end, it describes state and federal disaster planning and mitigation programs and resources in the context of a broader approach that leverages intergovernmental climate change planning and management. The chapter includes numerous case studies of local hazard mitigation efforts, particularly those guided by land use planning and regulation. The difficulty of planning managed retreat from development in vulnerable areas caused by the total takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is discussed and a path forward illuminated. The chapter concludes by discussing why the existential threat of climate change and related natural disasters can no longer be addressed by uncoordinated efforts. We can choose to succeed by engaging in collaborative efforts utilizing all legal powers, technical expertise, and financial resources available.
Climate change presents two types of risks: those we can adapt to or try to counteract and those beyond our power to cope. The first group includes (1) sea level rise, which threatens much of our infrastructure and cultural patrimony; (2) extreme weather, particularly storm events; (3) climate alterations harmful to agriculture; (4) loss of biodiversity; (5) ocean acidification that interferes with shell production and threatens marine food chains; and (6) threats to human health from disease and especially extreme heat. The second group, which encompasses an unmanageable intensification of all of the first, is the risk of runaway climate change. This can arise if elevated atmospheric carbon concentrations trigger positive feedback mechanisms, like stored methane releases, widespread forest die-offs, reduction of the Earth’s albedo, or changes in prevalent cloud formations that amplify initial warming effects, resulting in a “hothouse Earth.” The tools of standard welfare economics, like calculation of a social cost of carbon and its use in cost–benefit analysis, are unhelpful. Their basis in marginal effects is contradicted by the scale of climate impacts, and their deference to consumer judgment tells us little about the political judgments that must guide policy trade-offs.
This article deals with the sea level rise phenomenon caused by the climate change process and its impact on the statehood of so-called disappearing island states as well as on the consequent factual and legal status of their populations. In classical international law doctrine, the loss of a state’s territory will lead to the extinction of statehood and, consequently, the loss of that state’s international legal personality, and possibly also to the statelessness of its nationals. This article proposes an alternative solution based on the transformation of disappearing island states into new non-territorial subjects of international law — “climate deterritorialized nations” — as successors to disappeared inundated states.
This article is a rejoinder to Dr. Massimo Lando’s ‘Stability of maritime boundaries and the challenge of geographical change’ which proposes that positive international law offers no legal basis for the delimitation of fluctuating boundaries and discusses the many complexities involved in the delimitation and management of such boundaries. This rejoinder delves deeper into the main point of contention: the legal basis for fluctuating boundaries. It argues that coastal states have an inherent entitlement to a territorial sea and that Article 15 of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entails a default rule for the establishment of provisional fluctuating boundaries. This limit is not necessarily a strict median line because it may be adjusted by reference to special circumstances. Furthermore, the lack of explicit reference to provisional arrangements in UNCLOS Article 15 should not be read as an indication that there are no provisional boundaries in the absence of boundary agreements.
This article further argues that there are judicial precedents for fluctuating boundary-segments. The Nicaragua v. Honduras decision left a segment of the territorial sea un-delimited, resulting in a partially fluctuating boundary, until otherwise agreed. Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explicitly established a mobile boundary-segment in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua but as highlighted by Dr. Lando, this was done with the permission of the parties. Much depends on the claims brought by disputing parties and their stance on fluctuating boundaries but this decision demonstrated the ICJ’s willingness to employ fluctuating boundaries in response to coastal instability.
Geographical phenomena impacting the shape of coastlines may have implications for the stability of maritime boundaries delimited by agreement or judicial process. Sea level rise resulting from human-caused climate change has recently arisen as an additional phenomenon compelling the re-assessment of the stability of maritime boundaries over time. In a recent article published in this Journal, Dr. Snjólaug Árnadóttir has argued that a solution to the challenges of coastline change could be for maritime boundaries to fluctuate following the fluctuation of the baselines on which their course depends. By way of reply to Dr. Árnadóttir’s suggestion, this article argues that fluctuating boundaries have no legal basis either in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or in judicial decisions. Moreover, the delimitation process in three stages, commonly applied by international courts and tribunals since the Black Sea judgment, appears to be ill-suited for establishing fluctuating boundaries. There seems to be other solutions to the problem of coastline change, which this article also briefly explores.
The international law of the sea is premised on the fact that maritime entitlements are generated by the coast. This is rooted in the assumption that territory is permanent and, consequently, a relatively stable basis for the division of jurisdictional zones at sea. However, sea level rise and coastal erosion are currently tearing at the foundation of all maritime entitlements, in ways that were not anticipated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Sea levels are rising and they will continue to rise, by several metres if the ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica become unstable. Ocean warming and acidification are increasing; threatening marine ecosystems and leading to loss of biodiversity. Extreme weather events, floods, hurricanes and extreme waves are becoming frequent in most parts of the world. These changes will affect the living conditions of at least 300 million people by 2050. They will also affect marine ecosystems, islands, rocks, shoals, reefs and the maritime entitlements they generate. The consequences will be particularly severe for low-lying island States and some of them may cease to exist when they lose all habitable territory.
Coastal States exercise sovereignty and sovereign rights in maritime zones, measured from their coasts. The limits to these maritime zones are bound to recede as sea levels rise and coastlines are eroded. Furthermore, ocean acidification and ocean warming are increasingly threatening coastal ecosystems, which States are obligated to protect and manage sustainably. These changes, accelerating as the planet heats, prompt an urgent need to clarify and update the international law of maritime zones. This book explains how bilateral maritime boundaries are established, and how coastal instability and vulnerable ecosystems can affect the delimitation process through bilateral negotiations or judicial settlement. Árnadóttir engages with core concepts within public international law to address emerging issues, such as diminishing territory and changing boundaries. She proposes viable ways of addressing future challenges and sets out how fundamental changes to the marine environment can justify termination or revision of settled maritime boundaries and related agreements.
The most important mechanism of climate change can be understood by everyone: Why do greenhouse gasses have such a direct warming effect on our planet? This chapter approaches this question with a Do-It-Yourself (DIY) attitude.First, the humorous tale of Stinky, Dinxie, Bif, and Moo teaches us how the greenhouse effect really works. It's a straightforward matter of balancing energy, not a matter for belief. Also, it turns out that the atmosphere is really thin, and has a lot less actual mass than we might at first think. Then, this understanding is augmented by lots and lots of data. Multiple independent data sources hammer home convergent evidence identifying very rapid levels of observed warming. Looking at air temperatures, ocean temperatures, and global sea levels, we see extremely rapid rates of warming, rates that have increased dramatically in the last decade. 2015–2019 stand out as exceptionally warm. Global temperatures are modeled extremely well by climate models, while the observed warming doesn’t track at all with changes in incoming solar radiation, and these changes are very small energetically. We don’t need to believe in climate change; we can understand and observe it. The chapter introduction and a sidebar use the devastating Thomas Fire to set this warming in context.
Salt marshes are expected to undergo substantial change or, potentially, disappear in the next couple of centuries as a result of rising sea level. Increasingly, scientists are asking the question: how long can they survive? This book draws on global expertise to look at how salt marshes evolved, how they function, and how they are responding to the stresses caused by social and environmental change. These environments occur throughout the world: behind barrier islands, bordering estuaries, and dominating lower delta plains (Fig. 1.1) in warm to cool latitudes (≥ 30° latitude). Up until now, previous loss and degradation of coastal marshes has been related to a variety of human actions including dredging and filling, reduction in sediment supplies, and hydrocarbon withdrawal, as well as other causes. However, in the future the greatest impact to marshes will be a consequence of climate change, especially sea-level rise (SLR). Most of the present marshes formed under very different sedimentation and SLR regimes compared to those that occur today. During their formation and throughout their evolution, the rate of SLR was relatively slow and steady, between 0.2 and 1.6 mm/year (Table 1.1). The sustainability of marshes is now threatened by an acceleration in SLR to rates many times greater than those under which they initiated and have evolved. For example, the Romney marsh, which is located north of Boston, Massachusetts, contains a 2-m-thick peat that began forming 3.1 ka BP when sea level was rising at about 0.8 mm/year, a rate that slowed to 0.52 mm/year around 1 ka BP (Donnelly 2006). The rate of SLR in Boston Harbor is now 2.85 mm/year (NOAA 2019), which far exceeds the rate occurring when the Romney marsh built to a supratidal elevation. Eventually, SLR, along with marsh-edge erosion, will outpace the ability of most marshes to accrete vertically (Crosby et al. 2016) and/or compensate for marsh loss by expanding into uplands (Kirwan et al. 2016, Farron 2018).
The salt marsh response to a changing climate may be more complex than that of either terrestrial or marine ecosystems because salt marshes exist at the interface of land and sea and both bring changes to the marsh. Climate change may exacerbate anthropogenic-related stresses that salt marsh plants are already experiencing, limiting their resilience (Keddy 2011). In this chapter we discuss major climate change impacts likely to affect salt marshes including temperature, sea level rise (SLR), salinity, CO2, freshwater flow, sediment, and nutrients, and consider how salt marsh plants respond to these impacts and potential interactions of these impacts. Specifically, we explore changes in plant productivity and decomposition rates, aboveground and belowground biomass, and stem density as they are central to understanding marsh responses on a larger scale, with implications for species composition, elevation change, nutrient cycling, carbon sequestration, food webs, and ultimately marsh survival. Although this chapter is focused on salt marshes, examples from tidal fresh and brackish marshes are also included to a limited extent where relevant.
Aspects of species life histories may increase their susceptibility to climate change. Owing to their exclusive reliance on environmental sources of heat for incubation, megapodes may be especially vulnerable. We employed a trait-based vulnerability assessment to weigh their exposure to projected climate variables of increasing temperatures, fluctuating rainfall and sea level rise and their biological sensitivity and capacity to adapt. While all 21 species were predicted to experience at least a 2 °C increase in mean annual temperature, 12 to experience a moderate or greater fluctuation in rainfall and 16 to experience rising seas, the most vulnerable megapodes are intrinsically rare and range restricted. Species that employ microbial decomposition for incubation may have an adaptive advantage over those that do not and may be more resilient to climate change. The moderate microclimate necessary for mound incubation, however, may in some areas be threatened by anthropogenic habitat loss exacerbated by warmer and seasonally drier conditions. As with many avian species, little is known about the capacity of megapodes to adapt to a changing climate. We therefore recommend that future research efforts investigate megapode fecundity, gene flow and genetic connectivity at the population level to better determine their adaptive capacity.
Coastal plain stratigraphy is often over looked in paleo–sea-level reconstructions because carbonate sediments do not precisely constrain former sea level. Pacific Island sedimentology provides an invaluable record of geomorphic and environmental consequences of coastal evolution in response to changes in sea level and local tectonics. A series of coastal auger cores obtained from eastern ʻUpolu reveal a subsurface carbonate sand envelope predominately composed of coral and coralline algae derived from the reef framework. Coupling the sedimentological record with geophysical models of Holocene sea level, we identify a critical value (0.3–1.0 m) during the falling phase of the sea-level high stand (1899–2103 cal yr BP) that represents the transition from a transgressive to a regressive environment and initiates coastal progradation. Correlating the critical value with time, we observe nearly a millennium of coastal plain development is required before a small human population is established. Our findings support previous studies arguing that Sāmoa was colonized by small and isolated groups, as post–mid-Holocene drawdown in regional sea level produced coastal settings that were morphologically attractive for human settlement. As future sea level approaches mid-Holocene high stand values, lessons learned from Pacific Island sedimentological records may be useful in guiding future decisions related to coastal processes and habitat suitability.
Sea-level rise during the late Pleistocene and early Holocene inundated nearshore areas in many parts of the world, producing drastic changes in local ecosystems and obscuring significant portions of the archeological record. Although global forces are at play, the effects of sea-level rise are highly localized due to variability in glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA) effects. Interpretations of coastal paleoecology and archeology require reliable estimates of ancient shorelines that account for GIA effects. Here we build on previous models for California's Northern Channel Islands, producing more accurate late Pleistocene and Holocene paleogeographic reconstructions adjusted for regional GIA variability. This region has contributed significantly to our understanding of early New World coastal foragers. Sea level that was about 80-85 m lower than present at the time of the first known human occupation brought about a landscape and ecology substantially different than today. During the late Pleistocene, large tracts of coastal lowlands were exposed, while a colder, wetter climate and fluctuating marine conditions interacted with rapidly evolving littoral environments. At the close of the Pleistocene and start of the Holocene, people in coastal California faced shrinking land, intertidal, and subtidal zones, with important implications for resource availability and distribution.
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) aims to help people make better decisions. But BCA does not always serve this role as well as intended. In particular, BCA’s aim of aggregating all attributes of concern to decision makers into a single, best-estimate metric can conflict with the differing world views and values that may be an inherent characteristic of many climate-related decisions. This paper argues that new approaches exist that can help reduce the tension between the benefits of providing useful, scientifically based information to decision makers and the costs of aggregating uncertainty and differing values into single best estimates. Enabled by new information technology, these approaches can summarize decision-relevant information in new ways. Viewed in this light, many limitations of BCA lie not in the approach itself, but with the way it is used. In particular, this paper will argue that the problem lies in a process that begins by first assigning agreed-upon values to all the relevant inputs and then using BCA to rank the desirability of alternative decision options. In contrast, BCA can be used as part of a process that begins by acknowledging a wide range of ethical and epistemological views, examines which combinations of views are most important in affecting the ranking among proposed decision options, and uses this information to identify and seek consensus on actions that are robust over a wide range of such views.
Global sea level is rising at an increased rate since the late 19th century as a result of rising global mean temperatures. This rise is geographically non-uniform, with substantial spatial differences, and in the latest decade faster than expected. New evidence suggests that more rapid changes than indicated in the Fourth IPCC report take place in the two large continental ice sheets, Greenland and Antarctica. Consequently, the projected sea level rise threatens low-lying countries like the Netherlands. The process of ‘climate-proofing’ the flood protection system of the country offers, however, new opportunities for innovative solutions, providing not only higher flood protection, but also possibilities for multifunctional land-use.
In light of the urgent need for coastal adaptation policies and the impediments to their implementation, this article examines the early experience with coastal adaptation policies in the EU (in particular the Netherlands and the UK) and Australia, with a view to identifying the important features of an effective regulatory framework for coastal adaptation. We conclude that an integrated approach to coastal adaptation law is currently needed to lay the foundations for the required long-term strategy. Such an approach would establish processes by which adaptation objectives are agreed for each part of the coast, ensure land use planning that can accommodate future change and does not expose new communities to risk, integrate coastal adaptation with biodiversity and coastal zone policy, allocate regulatory responsibility in a way that promotes subsidiarity and consistency, and ensure that funds are available for future measures.