While research on the right to freedom of thought (FOT), as such, is already scarce, this chapter targets the European regional human rights framework in particular, attempting to fill the existing gap in research and literature. It aims to offer an exploratory analysis of the right to FOT through the prism of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and related jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Specifically, this chapter inquires whether the right to FOT can indeed be considered a right with independent value in the context of the ECHR, or whether it must rather be understood as an ancillary right, subordinate to and dependent on related ECHR rights (in a similar fashion as Article 14). In exploring this, a distinction must be drawn between the theoretical set-up of FOT in the ECHR and the drafters’ intention compared to how the ECtHR’s interpretation and application shaped the right in practice. By focusing on the question of its nature within the ECHR this chapter aims to stimulate further engagement with this under-researched right.

This chapter introduces the reader to the handbook with a particular focus on the methodology employed by contributors to the book. Drawing on the various contributions, the chapter presents a brief comparative overview of the right to freedom of thought before offering some reflections on the scope of the right.

This chapter analyses the right to freedom of thought in the Chilean legal order, considering its various juristic dimensions. Though historically rooted in the nation’s foundational charters, it remains ambiguously defined within its legal system, primarily interpreted through the lenses of freedom of conscience and expression. This chapter argues that whilst the right to freedom of thought has not yet been explicitly enshrined in the Chilean Constitution, it has been implicitly incorporated through international human rights treaties; however, due to recent technological advances, a pressing re-evaluation has arisen. The 2021 Constitutional Reform Act innovatively protected brain activities by resorting to the right to mental integrity, introducing a paradigm shift in juridical safeguarding of cognitive freedoms. This development, however, presents new conceptual and systematic challenges. The chapter focuses on the historical evolution of the right to freedom of thought, judicial interpretations, and scholarly perspectives, mainly concentrating on the emerging category of ‘neurorights’. It examines the implications of the 2021 constitutional amendment and argues for a more precise recognition and theoretical development of the right in response to neurotechnological progress. The analysis underscores the necessity of unambiguously defining cognitive freedoms and freedom of thought to provide adequate legal protections in an era of rapid technological change.

Although section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifies the fundamental freedoms of ‘thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication’, only freedom of expression has been developed by the courts. These forgotten freedoms include freedom of thought. This chapter demonstrates how Canada’s own constitutional text and history supports a new recognition of freedom of thought that would overcome a recent history of forgetting this constitutional freedom. Canada’s own constitutional case law, read creatively, contains the seeds of a framework for freedom of thought, with upcoming potential to put arguments before the courts in cases where significant litigation efforts will be made. This chapter sets how the Canadian Charter protects specific elements of the right which are mental privacy, mental liberty and mental autonomy. The contemporary debate within the present international discussion generates an intellectual atmosphere and comparative case law that can support a remembering of the forgotten freedom of thought.