This chapter examines the relationship between the administrative state and constitutional values and structures with reference to German and American legal and political theory. It recovers from these intertwined traditions three analytical approaches to the administrative state. The first analytical approach understands the administrative state to implement the constitution. The second understands the administrative state to generate new constitutional structures and values. The third understands the administrative state to displace the constitution with patterns and practices of rule that lie outside of the existing governance framework. These frameworks foreground normative analysis of how the administrative state ought to relate to general democratic principles and the specific constitutional rules that institutionalize them. I argue for a differentiated and developmental understanding of the relationship between democracy, constitution, and administration. The concrete administration of democratic values should allow constitutional rules to shift in light of social and historical context. The administrative state should not be strictly limited by, but rather should facilitate critical interrogation of, the constitution’s current instantiation of democratic values. The administrative state can and should hold the constitution open for the introduction and proliferation of new institutional configurations and forms of public life.

Regulation is a pervasive feature of contemporary capitalism. How to ensure, in democratic states, that those to whom regulatory power and functions have has been delegated act in line with constitutional norms and values is a perennial, and much explored, question. This chapter seeks to do two things: first to set out a framework for analysing regulatory systems, and second, to use that framework to explore how constitutional actors seek to regulate, or more specifically to constitutionalise, the regulators they have created. In using a regulatory framework to analyse this element of constitutional systems, it thus proposes to ‘flip’ the usual perspective, and not just look (down) at regulatory systems from a constitutional perspective, but also look (up) at constitutions from a regulatory perspective. This flipped perspective will be used to conceptualise constitutions not from the starting point of established constitutional, legal or political theory but from a particular regulatory theory, that of decentred or polycentric regulation, and to explore the different ways in which ‘regulators are regulated’ through the interplay of the constitutional governance system with the regulatory systems it creates: through the goals and values each seeks to pursue, the techniques, organisations and individuals through which each acts, the particular sets of ideas or cognitive and epistemological frameworks those actors bring, and with a continual need both for, and in constant pursuit of, trust and legitimacy in the eyes of those on whose behalf they purport to govern.

Environmental policies and enforcement pose fundamental corruption issues relating to the tensions between economic self-interest and the public good. By directing our attention to the challenges of collective action, they also highlight the importance of state-level institutional and political characteristics – notably, the political clout of industrial and environmental lobby groups. High levels of corruption and low levels of trust both weaken the stringency and enforcement of environmental policies and affect levels of emissions, although as levels of trust in a state increase, the effects of corruption weaken or vanish. Our environmental findings closely parallel those in other chapters having to do with COVID policies – not surprising, as they raise similar questions of policy and compliance – and support our argument that thinking solely in terms of specific acts of rule- or law-breaking is an incomplete understanding of corruption, its causes, and its consequences.

This chapter engages with the misconception that one must control or master emotional experience. Emotions cannot be controlled or contained, and by doing so the individual creates inner disturbance and havoc. The author discusses the processes of channeling emotions in growth-promoting practices. Meditation, mindfulness, and creative expression are discussed to provide readers with a multicultural perspective on emotional management. This chapter also discusses the differences and consequences of adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation habits.

This chapter evaluates anti-money laundering (AML) regulation of crypto-assets in the UK with a focus on the UK implementation of the EU’s 5th Money Laundering Directive. The UK implementation had a broader scope than that required under the Directive; however, there was a lack of specific requirements and guidance on certain potentially higher-risk areas including privacy coins, mixers, and decentralised finance (DeFi). This chapter suggests that specific AML requirements and guidance on these potentially higher risk areas may help ensure the associated risks are effectively mitigated.

In the light of the growing interest in crypto-assets and the quest for their institutionalisation, we examine the role that they can play as investable assets useful in standard portfolio problems when asset returns are predictable. In particular, we study whether a mix of macroeconomic factors and crypto-specific predictors can be combined to produce accurate and economically valuable pooled forecasts. With reference to Bitcoin data, we uncover that crypto returns are predictable out-of-sample. Moreover, when this crypto-asset is made available to a mean-variance optimising investor, it generates large risk-adjusted realised performance gains irrespective of the assumed risk aversion. The results on the predictability of cryptocurrencies are robust to a generalisation to Litecoin and Ripple, although on a shorter 2015–2020 sample. However, results turn mixed and come to depend on the assumed risk aversion, when we investigate the power of forecast combinations to generate economic value from the entire pool of cryptocurrencies.

There has been progress made in the adoption of digital assets by institutional investors. Large institutions including Fidelity, BlackRock, and several investment banks have started providing products and services to satisfy the needs of their clients. Hedge funds and venture capital funds are also investing in digital assets. Global exchanges have introduced investable products based on cryptocurrency derivatives. The number of ways one can invest in digital assets is expected to grow with the introduction of new products. Digital assets are still very new and carry considerable risk. It is prudent of regulators to cautiously approach regulation. At the same time, the markets are looking for clarity from financial regulators. If and when there is more regulatory clarity, the pace of adoption is likely to pick up.

This chapter aims to understand the entrepreneurial perspective on legal innovation. How do those who create legal innovation make the services and products that improve the way law is used? The conversation centres on topics such as passion for innovation, identifying needs for new products and services, dealing with failure, keys to success in the market, innovation networks, regulatory approaches to innovation and innovation in the financial services industry. The chapter also considers aspects of innovation that are particular to legal services. Among them are the creation and availability of legal datasets for the application of artificial intelligence and the transferability of legal innovation to other jurisdictions with different laws.

Conlusion: Summary of findings

Chapter 2 considers the historical context from which today’s station hustle has emerged as a distinct economic logic and mode of production. It relates the station’s contemporary workings to the history of local economic practices and the wider political and economic changes that have shaped commercial road transport since the early days of motorisation in the early twentieth century, emphasising the role that bus stations have played in these developments. It shows how local transport operators have long harnessed the logics of risk, competition, and shrewd resourcefulness as the principal properties of economic organisation and action, features that have allowed them to both capitalise on and compensate for the weakness of the services provided by the state. The ways in which they have accommodated the effects of state regulatory intervention are consistent with these logics: in most cases, state intervention has been considered just another element of market volatility.

Like information disseminated through online platforms, infectious diseases can cross international borders as they track the movement of people (and sometimes animals and goods) and spread globally. Hence, their control and management have major implications for international relations, and international law. Drawing on this analogy, this chapter looks to global health governance to formulate suggestions for the governance of online platforms. Successes in global health governance suggest that the principle of tackling low-hanging fruit first to build trust and momentum towards more challenging goals may extend to online platform governance. Progress beyond the low-hanging fruit appears more challenging: For one, disagreement on the issue of resource allocation in the online platform setting may lead to “outbreaks” of disinformation being relegated to regions of the world that may not be at the top of online platforms’ market priorities lists. Secondly, while there may be wide consensus on the harms of infectious disease outbreaks, the harms from the spread of disinformation are more contested. Relying on national definitions of disinformation would hardly yield coherent international cooperation. Global health governance would thus suggest that an internationally negotiated agreement on standards as it relates to disinformation may be necessary.

In order to manage the issue of diversity of regulatory vision, States may, to some extent, harmonize substantive regulation—eliminating diversity. This is less likely than States determining unilaterally or multilaterally to develop manageable rules of jurisdiction, so that their regulation applies only in limited circumstances. The fullest realization of this “choice of law” solution would involve geoblocking or other technology that divides up regulatory authority according to a specified, and a perhaps agreed, principle. Geoblocking may be costly and ultimately porous, but it would allow different communities to effectuate their different visions of the good in the platform context. To the extent that the principles of jurisdiction are agreed, and are structured to be exclusive, platforms would have the certainty of knowing the requirements under which they must operate in each market. Of course, different communities may remain territorial states, but given the a-territorial nature of the internet, it may be possible for other divisions of authority and responsibility to develop. Cultural affinity, or political perspective, may be more compelling as an organizational principle to some than territorial co-location.

While the social media and digital platforms started with an objective to enhance social connectivity and information sharing, they also present a significant challenge in content moderation resulting in spreading disinformation. Disinformation Paradox is a phenomenon where an attempt to regulate harmful content online can inadvertently amplifies it. The social media platforms often serve as breeding grounds for disinformation. This chapter discusses the inherent difficulties in moderating content at a large scale, different responses of these platforms and potential solutions.