This paper proves normalisation theorems for intuitionist and classical negative free logic, without and with the operator for definite descriptions. Rules specific to free logic give rise to new kinds of maximal formulas additional to those familiar from standard intuitionist and classical logic. When is added it must be ensured that reduction procedures involving replacements of parameters by terms do not introduce new maximal formulas of higher degree than the ones removed. The problem is solved by a rule that permits restricting these terms in the rules for $\forall $, $\exists $ and to parameters or constants. A restricted subformula property for deductions in systems without is considered. It is improved upon by an alternative formalisation of free logic building on an idea of Jaśkowski’s. In the classical system the rules for require treatment known from normalisation for classical logic with $\lor $ or $\exists $. The philosophical significance of the results is also indicated.

We present a linearity theorem for a proof language of intuitionistic multiplicative additive linear logic, incorporating addition and scalar multiplication. The proofs in this language are linear in the algebraic sense. This work is part of a broader research program aiming to define a logic with a proof language that forms a quantum programming language.

On the basis of Poincaré and Weyl’s view of predicativity as invariance, we develop an extensive framework for predicative, type-free first-order set theory in which $\Gamma _0$ and much bigger ordinals can be defined as von Neumann ordinals. This refutes the accepted view of $\Gamma _0$ as the “limit of predicativity”.

A terminating sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic is obtained by modifying the R$\supset $ rule of the labelled sequent calculus $\mathbf {G3I}$. This is done by adding a variant of the principle of a fortiori in the left-hand side of the premiss of the rule. In the resulting calculus, called ${\mathbf {G3I}}_{\mathbf {t}}$, derivability of any given sequent is directly decidable by root-first proof search, without any extra device such as loop-checking. In the negative case, the failed proof search gives a finite countermodel to the sequent on a reflexive, transitive, and Noetherian Kripke frame. As a byproduct, a direct proof of faithfulness of the embedding of intuitionistic logic into Grzegorcyk logic is obtained.

We formulate Hilbert’s epsilon calculus in the context of expansion proofs. This leads to a simplified proof of the epsilon theorems by disposing of the need for prenexification, Skolemisation, and their respective inverse transformations. We observe that the natural notion of cut in the epsilon calculus is associative.

We present an analogue of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem for systems of second-order arithmetic. Whereas Gödel showed that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi ^0_1$-sound and $\Sigma ^0_1$-definable do not prove their own $\Pi ^0_1$-soundness, we prove that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi ^1_1$-sound and $\Sigma ^1_1$-definable do not prove their own $\Pi ^1_1$-soundness. Our proof does not involve the construction of a self-referential sentence but rather relies on ordinal analysis.

We present a series of proof systems for exact entailment (i.e., relevant truthmaker preservation from premises to conclusion) and prove soundness and completeness. Using the proof systems, we observe that exact entailment is hyperintensional not only in the sense of Cresswell, but also in the sense recently proposed by Odintsov and Wansing.

Minimally inconsistent LP (MiLP) is a nonmonotonic paraconsistent logic based on Graham Priest’s logic of paradox (LP). Unlike LP, MiLP purports to recover, in consistent situations, all of classical reasoning. The present paper conducts a proof-theoretic analysis of MiLP. I highlight certain properties of this logic, introduce a simple sequent system for it, and establish soundness and completeness results. In addition, I show how to use my proof system in response to a criticism of this logic put forward by J. C. Beall.

In this paper I argue for an association between impurity and explanatory power in contemporary mathematics. This proposal is defended against the ancient and influential idea that purity and explanation go hand-in-hand (Aristotle, Bolzano) and recent suggestions that purity/impurity ascriptions and explanatory power are more or less distinct (Section 1). This is done by analyzing a central and deep result of additive number theory, Szemerédi’s theorem, and various of its proofs (Section 2). In particular, I focus upon the radically impure (ergodic) proof due to Furstenberg (Section 3). Furstenberg’s ergodic proof is striking because it utilizes intuitively foreign and infinitary resources to prove a finitary combinatorial result and does so in a perspicuous fashion. I claim that Furstenberg’s proof is explanatory in light of its clear expression of a crucial structural result, which provides the “reason why” Szemerédi’s theorem is true. This is, however, rather surprising: how can such intuitively different conceptual resources “get a grip on” the theorem to be proved? I account for this phenomenon by articulating a new construal of the content of a mathematical statement, which I call structural content (Section 4). I argue that the availability of structural content saves intuitive epistemic distinctions made in mathematical practice and simultaneously explicates the intervention of surprising and explanatorily rich conceptual resources. Structural content also disarms general arguments for thinking that impurity and explanatory power might come apart. Finally, I sketch a proposal that, once structural content is in hand, impure resources lead to explanatory proofs via suitably understood varieties of simplification and unification (Section 5).

This paper is dedicated to extending and adapting to modal logic the approach of fractional semantics to classical logic. This is a multi-valued semantics governed by pure proof-theoretic considerations, whose truth-values are the rational numbers in the closed interval $[0,1]$. Focusing on the modal logic K, the proposed methodology relies on three key components: bilateral sequent calculus, invertibility of the logical rules, and stability (proof-invariance). We show that our semantic analysis of K affords an informational refinement with respect to the standard Kripkean semantics (a new proof of Dugundji’s theorem is a case in point) and it raises the prospect of a proof-theoretic semantics for modal logic.

Herbrand’s theorem is one of the most fundamental insights in logic. From the syntactic point of view, it suggests a compact representation of proofs in classical first- and higher-order logics by recording the information of which instances have been chosen for which quantifiers. This compact representation is known in the literature as Miller’s expansion tree proof. It is inherently analytic and hence corresponds to a cut-free sequent calculus proof. Recently several extensions of such proof representations to proofs with cuts have been proposed. These extensions are based on graphical formalisms similar to proof nets and are limited to prenex formulas.

In this paper, we present a new syntactic approach that directly extends Miller’s expansion trees by cuts and also covers non-prenex formulas. We describe a cut-elimination procedure for our expansion trees with cut that is based on the natural reduction steps and shows that it is weakly normalizing.

This article investigates the proof theory of the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc) as developed and systematically studied by Hanoch Ben-Yami [3, 4]. Ben-Yami makes use of natural deduction (Suppes-Lemmon style), we, however, have chosen a sequent calculus presentation, which allows for the proofs of a multitude of significant meta-theoretic results with minor modifications to the Gentzen’s original framework, i.e., LK. As will be made clear in course of the article LK-Quarc will enjoy cut elimination and its corollaries (including subformula property and thus consistency).

This paper clarifies that linear implication defines a branching-time preorder, preserved in all contexts, when used to compare embeddings of process in non-commutative logic. The logic considered is a first-order extension of the proof system BV featuring a de Morgan dual pair of nominal quantifiers, called BV1. An embedding of π-calculus processes as formulae in BV1 is defined, and the soundness of linear implication in BV1 with respect to a notion of weak simulation in the π -calculus is established. A novel contribution of this work is that we generalise the notion of a ‘left proof’ to a class of formulae sufficiently large to compare embeddings of processes, from which simulating execution steps are extracted. We illustrate the expressive power of BV1 by demonstrating that results extend to the internal π -calculus, where privacy of inputs is guaranteed. We also remark that linear implication is strictly finer than any interleaving preorder.

In this paper, I motivate a cut free sequent calculus for classical logic with first order quantification, allowing for singular terms free of existential import. Along the way, I motivate a criterion for rules designed to answer Prior’s question about what distinguishes rules for logical concepts, like conjunction from apparently similar rules for putative concepts like Prior’s tonk, and I show that the rules for the quantifiers—and the existence predicate—satisfy that condition.

This is a general account of metavaluations and their applications, which can be seen as an alternative to standard model-theoretic methodology. They work best for what are called metacomplete logics, which include the contraction-less relevant logics, with possible additions of Conjunctive Syllogism, (A→B) & (B→C) → .A→C, and the irrelevant, A→ .B→A, these including the logic MC of meaning containment which is arguably a good entailment logic. Indeed, metavaluations focus on the formula-inductive properties of theorems of entailment form A→B, splintering into two types, M1- and M2-, according to key properties of negated entailment theorems (see below). Metavaluations have an inductive presentation and thus have some of the advantages that model theory does, but they represent proof rather than truth and thus represent proof-theoretic properties, such as the priming property, if ├ A $\vee$ B then ├ A or ├ B, and the negated-entailment properties, not-├ ∼(A→B) (for M1-logics, with M1-metavaluations) and ├ ∼(A→B) iff ├ A and ├ ∼ B (for M2-logics, with M2-metavaluations). Topics to be covered are their impact on naive set theory and paradox solution, and also Peano arithmetic and Godel’s First and Second Theorems. Interesting to note here is that the familiar M1- and M2-metacomplete logics can be used to solve the set-theoretic paradoxes and, by inference, the Liar Paradox and key semantic paradoxes. For M1-logics, in particular, the final metavaluation that is used to prove the simple consistency is far simpler than its correspondent in the model-theoretic proof in that it consists of a limit point of a single transfinite sequence rather than that of a transfinite sequence of such limit points, as occurs in the model-theoretic approach. Additionally, it can be shown that Peano Arithmetic is simply consistent, using metavaluations that constitute finitary methods. Both of these results use specific metavaluational properties that have no correspondents in standard model theory and thus it would be highly unlikely that such model theory could prove these results in their final forms.

B. Kooi and A. Tamminga present a correspondence analysis for extensions of G. Priest’s logic of paradox. Each unary or binary extension is characterizable by a special operator and analyzable via a sound and complete natural deduction system. The present paper develops a sound and complete proof searching technique for the binary extensions of the logic of paradox.

We introduce a way of relativizing operational set theory that also takes care of application. After presenting the basic approach and proving some essential properties of this new form of relativization we turn to the notion of relativized regularity and to the system OST (LR) that extends OST by a limit axiom claiming that any set is element of a relativized regular set. Finally we show that OST (LR) is proof-theoretically equivalent to the well-known theory KPi for a recursively inaccessible universe.

Hypersequent calculus (HC), developed by A. Avron, is one of the most interesting proof systems suitable for nonclassical logics. Although HC has rather simple form, it increases significantly the expressive power of standard sequent calculi (SC). In particular, HC proved to be very useful in the field of proof theory of various nonclassical logics. It may seem surprising that it was not applied to temporal logics so far. In what follows, we discuss different approaches to formalization of logics of linear frames and provide a cut-free HC formalization of Kt4.3, the minimal temporal logic of linear frames, and some of its extensions. The novelty of our approach is that hypersequents are defined not as finite (multi)sets but as finite lists of ordinary sequents. Such a solution allows both linearity of time flow, and symmetry of past and future, to be incorporated by means of six temporal rules (three for future-necessity and three dual rules for past-necessity). Extensions of the basic calculus with simple structural rules cover logics of serial and dense frames. Completeness is proved by Schütte/Hintikka-style argument using models built from saturated hypersequents.

We present a cut elimination argument that witnesses the conservativity of the compositional axioms for truth (without the extended induction axiom) over any theory interpreting a weak subsystem of arithmetic. In doing so we also fix a critical error in Halbach’s original presentation. Our methods show that the admission of these axioms determines a hyper-exponential reduction in the size of derivations of truth-free statements.