This article redirects extant critiques of the modern problem of war at this problem's underlying logic of deviance. According to this logic, war constitutes a kind of international conduct that contravenes behavioural norms and that can be corrected through diagnostic and didactic means. Thereby, war is rendered into a problem falling within the scope of human agency. However, this agency rests on and reproduces this logic's constitutive blind spots. Therefore, it seems imperative to develop ways of problematising war otherwise. The article provides two starting points for (critical) IR scholarship seeking to undertake such a project. Firstly, it combines two Foucaultian tools, the concept of problematisation and the method of genealogy, to direct critique at the logics underlying our evaluative – analytical, ethical, and political – judgements. Secondly, it uses these tools to trace the contingent emergence of the logic of deviance in a crucial example within the wider genealogy of the problem of war: the Carnegie Endowment's commission of inquiry into the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Based on original archival research, I highlight different elements of this inquiry's problematisation of war – its frames, assumptions, ways of knowing, and subjects of knowledge – to make them available for reconstruction.

This article by Adrian Howe is based on a presentation given at the ‘Sources and Methods in Criminology and Criminal Justice Conference’ in November 2015, jointly sponsored by the Institute of Advanced Education and the Socio-Legal Studies Association. She begins by querying whether there are indeed distinct feminist methods in the social sciences. She outlines the impact of what she calls the ‘methodical revolution’ on the criminology discipline, Foucault's contribution and Foucauldian methodologies deployed in criminological and criminal justice research.

In this paper we use Alvesson and Sandberg's strategy of problematisation to analyse the assumptions embedded in the development and use of the concept of ‘care-giver burden’. We do this in order to develop an explanation as to why decades of research into the experience of providing home-based care to a family member with dementia has had little effect in relieving or reducing the ‘burden’ of that care. Though some part of this is undoubtedly political, our analysis suggests that key assumptions of the research limit both knowledge development and intervention effectiveness. Especially problematic are first, an overriding focus on the isolated care-giver–recipient dyad as the appropriate object of inquiry and target of intervention, and second, an absence of an analysis of the materiality of care and care-giving practices. The heterogeneity of care situations, including interrelations among people, technologies, objects, spaces and other organisational worlds, appear in much of the research primarily as methodological problems, variables to be subdued through a more rigorous application of method. The high volume of research and acknowledged low impact of interventions, however, suggests that rethinking the nature of care practices, and how we come to know about them, is necessary if we are to develop and implement strategies that will contribute to better outcomes for people.