The first “R” from animal research ethics prescribes the replacement of animal experiments with animal-free alternatives. However, the question of when an animal-free method qualifies as an alternative to animal experiments remains unresolved.

Drawing lessons from another debate in which the word “alternative” is central, the ethical debate on alternatives to germline genome editing, this paper develops a general account of when something qualifies as an alternative to something. It proposes three ethically significant conditions that technique, method, or approach X must meet to qualify as an alternative to Y: (1) X must address the same problem as Y, under an appropriate description of that problem; (2) X must have a reasonable chance of success, compared to Y, in solving the problem; and (3) X must not be ethically unacceptable as a solution. If X meets all these conditions, its relative advantages and disadvantages determine whether it is preferable, indifferent, or dispreferable as an alternative to Y.

This account is then applied to the question of whether animal-free research methods qualify as alternatives to animal research. Doing so breaks down the debate around this question into more focused (ethical and other) issues and illustrates the potential of the account.

This paper considers the relevance of the concept of “eugenics,”—a term associated with some of the most egregious crimes of the twentieth century—to the possibility of editing human genomes. The author identifies some uses of gene editing as eugenics but proposes that this identification does not suffice to condemn them. He proposes that we should distinguish between “morally wrong” practices, which should be condemned, and “morally problematic” practices that call for solutions, and he suggests that eugenic uses of gene editing fall into this latter category. Although when we choose the characteristics of future people we are engaging in morally dangerous acts, some interventions in human heredity should nevertheless be acknowledged as morally good. These morally good eugenic interventions include some uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The author argues that we should think about eugenic interventions in the same way that we think about morally problematic interventions in public health. When we recognize some uses of gene editing as eugenics, we make the dangers of selecting or modifying human genetic material explicit.

This study aimed to investigate the optimum number of embryos to be biopsied in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining a balanced/normal embryo following preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) by fluorescence in situ hybridisation (FISH) for translocation carriers. Patients with low number of fertilised oocytes (≤5) or low number of embryos available for PGD (<7) underwent multiple hormonal stimulation cycles and their embryos from each cycle were vitrified and accumulated to obtain at least three embryos for PGD. Fifty-seven PGD cycles were performed for translocation carriers by FISH on day 3 of embryo development. PGD and pregnancy outcomes were examined according to the number of embryos biopsied. The cancellation rates of embryo transfer for the reciprocal translocation carriers were 40% when more than eight embryos were biopsied and it was as high as 78% when low number of embryos (less than nine) were biopsied. For Robertsonian translocation carriers, when more than eight embryos were biopsied, there were no embryo transfer cancellations. This study showed that when there are more than nine embryos biopsied for PGD, the likelihood of obtaining a balanced embryo and positive pregnancy outcome is significantly higher (P < 0.05) in such the overall pregnancy rate was 63% for reciprocal and 86% for Robertsonian carriers. This was reduced to only 7% for reciprocal and 14% for Robertsonian translocation carriers when less than nine embryos were biopsied. One of the limitations of this study was that the analysis was performed by FISH and more studies should investigate the outcomes of embryo accumulation following comprehensive chromosome analysis.

Under English law a child born disabled, for instance by Tay Sachs disease, as a result of negligent embryo selection by preimplantation genetic diagnosis (‘PGD’), can sue the relevant health professionals by means of a 1990 amendment to the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) (‘CD’) Act 1976. By contrast, a second child conceived outside the in vitro fertilisation (‘IVF’) clinic, whose Tay Sachs is not detected in utero by means of prenatal diagnosis, can have no claim against the relevant health professionals due to the decision in McKay and Another v Essex Area Health Authority, which held that a child can have no claim for so-called “wrongful life”. This paper argues that this difference is anomalous and inequitable. It highlights the inadvertent way in which the legislative exception was crafted and shows that there are no relevant differences between the selection practices of PGD and PND that would in any event justify such different treatment. It critiques the English common law position on wrongful life by analysing the ethical and legal foundations of such a claim, arguing that the action should be permitted on the basis of a certain degree of severity, namely where a future child is likely to think that his or her life is not worth living. The analysis makes particular reference to developments since McKay in the law relating to the selective non-treatment of neonates, selective abortion, wrongful birth, and the action for wrongful life itself, as well as to the legal position of pregnant women in relation to the fetus, and the critique by people with disabilities of the practices of PGD and PND. The paper argues that McKay and those parts of the CD Act that purport to deny a claim for wrongful life to children born outside the IVF context should be revisited when the opportunity arises. The duty that health professionals already owe prospective parents to advise of a condition in a developing fetus that would give rise to serious impairments in the future child (which sounds in an action for so-called “wrongful birth”) should be owed at the same time to the future child, realised by advice to the pregnant woman, where a child is likely to be born with a condition that is so severe that any goods in life are outweighed by the burdens.

A new methodology for blastocyst biopsy that uses a 1.48μm in diode laser is described. Trophectoderm cells are biopsied after laster zona drilling and culture, fixed and processed for fluorescent in situ hybridisation (FISH) analysis. Preliminary results on the efficiency of the procedure and blastocyst recovery rate are promising. Blastocyst laser biopsy is a useful tool in preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) as it allows a more reliable diagnosis and widens the diagnostic possibilities on account of the higher number of cells obtained in the biopsy.