This chapter addresses the tensions between the high level of independence granted to the European Central Bank (ECB) under the Treaties and its accountability. In a first step, it sets out the legal framework of monetary policy within the system of the European System of Central Banks and explains in more detail the quantitative easing programmes of the ECB. It goes on to provide a summary of the back-and-forth litigation on the scope of monetary policy between the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Gauweiler and Weiss. Next, the chapter focuses on the judicial review of the monetary policy decisions by the Court of Justice and the national courts. Both these sections follow the same structure: first, they analyse access to courts and remedies; and second, they show how the courts under analysis approached the principles of equality and solidarity, for the purposes of achieving the common interest. The chapter closes with an examination of judicial interactions between EU and national courts and the role these play in the legal accountability of the ECB.

This chapter deals with the German position on States and their organs. It is divided into five parts; territorial sovereignty, political independence, Statehood and recognition, organs of the State and their status and State succession. The first part deals with the legal consequences of Germany’s non-recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea while distinguishing the same from sanctions policies, Germany’s position on the international legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Germany’s views on the presence of Thailand’s king in and his conduct of State affairs from Germany and Germany’s position on Israel’s annexation plans in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second part addresses Germany’s response to the new Hong Kong national security law, and Germany’s position on Taiwan. The third part, statehood and recognition, encompasses Germany’s opinion on Palestine not being a State party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Germany’s non-recognition of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, and Germany’s support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer.

This chapter deals with the German position on States and their organs. It is divided into five parts: territorial sovereignty; political independence; Statehood and recognition; organs of the State and their status; and State succession. The first part deals with the principles underpinning Germany’s delivery of humanitarian assistance; Germany’s view on the Kashmir conflict as an internal matter of India; Germany rebuking the United States for recognising Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, Germany’s criticism of Russia’s passportisation in Ukraine, Germany’s position on Georgia’s territorial integrity regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two German court rulings on the legality of Kuwait Airline’s practice of not transporting Israeli citizens; Germany granting refugee status to two activists from Hong Kong; and a German court’s decision on the return of an Iraqi citizen in a criminal case and possible links to the principle of male captus. The second part, political independence, deals with Germany opposing Facebook’s Libra currency on grounds of State sovereignty and advocating regaining digital sovereignty; and the meeting of Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas with Joshua Wong. The third, statehood and recognition, focuses on Germany confirming its non-recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

In most legal systems, courts perform two basic tasks: they resolve disputes in accordance with the law, and they formulate general rules to interpret, implement and enrich the existing body of law. Arbitration, in contrast, is not designed to contribute much to the lawmaking process by way of precedents. Its main function is dispute-resolution. The shortcomings of arbitration in jurisprudential terms are not problematic, in so far as courts are in a position to decide a sufficient number and variety of cases, in order to produce the pertinent case law. Accordingly, the high degree of political independence that arbitrators exhibit, when compared to courts, is not objectionable, given the limited part they play in the generation of norms.

Chapter 5 traces the final shift in Nauru’s status from trust territory to sovereign state in 1968. The dissolution of C Mandate status and the expanded trusteeship system placed Australia and South Africa out of step with global decolonisation movements. Their attempts to maintain control over Nauru and South West Africa attracted international criticism. The chapter examines the relationship between the South West Africa Cases and the UN’s embrace of Nauruan independence. Over the 1960s, the Trusteeship Council brokered independence negotiations between Australia and the Nauru Local Government Council. Australia gradually ceded political control and phosphate ownership but refused liability for the island’s rehabilitation. Nauru’s transition from trust territory to state was a profound achievement, but international recognition of Nauruan sovereignty was deeply ironic. The Republic was regarded less as a viable state than as a vehicle through which the Nauruan people could decide for themselves how to respond to the island’s environmental devastation. The chapter concludes that the 1968 Constitution marked a further accretion of an imperial form of established in the 1880s.