While the political aspect of the traditionalist quest for prescriptive Christianity has been central to the story from the start, this chapter examines, first, the complicated way that religious and political norms are intertwined in American history and dependent on whether the Christian community is in a position of power or not. Second, the chapter examines two aspects of Christian identity that are especially important in understanding contemporary American politics: (1) a global Christian identity that understands Christians as those persecuted by godless secular society, and (2) an antignostic identity that understands Christians as those who wage war against “gnosticism,” a term applicable to whatever conservative Christians are currently combatting in the political sphere.

Rawls assesses conceptions of justice in terms of how stable a society governed by them would be. I describe how Rawls presents this view of stability differently in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. I then argue that G.A. Cohen’s objections to this view largely fail insofar as we grant Rawls the claim that the task of principles of justice is to provide fair terms of cooperation. But I then develop an objection to this claim by drawing on Cohen’s critique of Rawls’s treatment of the circumstances of justice. These circumstances are more capacious than Rawls allows. Nonetheless, contra Cohen, we can retain one of the key insights of Rawls’s project, which is that justice is fundamentally about realizing a certain kind of relationship rather than realizing a particular distribution of goods. I sketch a Kantian conception of the relevant relationship and consider the role stability plays in it.

Suggesting the term of a “method of insulation,” this paper analyzes a development that characterizes Rawls’s thought after the publication of Theory. He sought to strengthen his theory of justice by seemingly weakening it, that is, by reducing its philosophical – and especially metaphysical – core commitments to what is absolutely essential for the theoretical enterprise to be successful, aiming at “doctrinal autonomy” and a “free-standing” conception of justice. In reconstructing the main “declarations of philosophical independence” until Political Liberalism, the major achievements but also the problems of this view are discussed. For there came a point at which the method of insulation endangered rather than strengthened the autonomous normative standing of Rawls’s “political” conception of justice.

Some commentators have expressed puzzlement about the influence a short paper of mine may have had on the development of John Rawls’s thought after the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. The issue arises because Rawls said in the Introduction to Political Liberalism that my paper had played a role in the evolution of his views, yet readers have found it difficult to understand how or why it did so. By examining some of Rawls’s published and unpublished lectures from the late 1970s and early 1980s, and drawing on correspondence I had with him during those years, I try to provide some context for his remarks about my paper and to refresh people’s memory of the issues that were on Rawls’s mind during that period. This may help to illuminate the position he eventually arrived at in Political Liberalism and some of the motivations for it.

This chapter explores Rawls’s suggestion that seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes may have been the first political liberal, by investigating whether Hobbes’s system makes room for a notion of the reasonable not reducible to instrumental rationality.

Rawls’s argument that a well-ordered society would be a social union of social unions is crucial to his larger argument for stability. The former argument depends upon what I call “the security assumption.” I contend that reasonable religious pluralism casts doubt on the assumption and on the argument which appeals to it. Seeing why the dubitability of the security assumption makes the idea of a social union of social unions non-viable, we can come to a better understanding of the development of Rawls’s thought. Equally if not more important is the relevance of the security assumption for contemporary politics. That assumption identifies a condition that must be satisfied if members of a liberal democracy are to find their collective activity as citizens inherently valuable. Failure to satisfy that condition suggests why some members of liberal democracies as we know them deny the inherent value of relations with their fellow citizens.

This chapter focuses on the relationship between consent and the moral educational aims of the liberal state. Consent is oft-cited as a condition for the legitimate use of coercive state power. Moral requirements are generally non-coercive on the face of it; nobody has the right to rule over our conscience. Curiously, liberal states often see the moral formation of citizens as subject to political requirements (e.g. compulsory civic education). How does the consent condition bear on these requirements? The general argument is that reasons for withholding consent to a liberal state moral education are often motivated by a specific worry about the relationship between morality and political authority, that is, that such authority will have undesirable downstream effects on these norms and attitudes. The chapter characterizes this worry in philosophical terms and proposes a solution in the form of a consent standard specific to the justification of a liberal state education.

Faced with the challenge of accommodating diversity, liberal justice and human rights promise to provide an adequate normative framework for securing equal liberties and rights for all. However, despite great advancements in theory and law, discrimination endures, and these promises have not been fulfilled for enduring minorities, especially in places of ethno-national conflict. The problem this chapter aims to highlight is that while liberal democracy and human rights frameworks provide us with a desirable ideal, they fail to provide useful guidance for progress, from a situation of ethno-national conflict – which often involves political exclusion, sharp inequalities, low mutual trust, and high animosity – to more just and peaceful societies that respect the human rights of all. Self-determination is currently blocked as a legal remedy; states are reluctant to grant minority rights, especially in cases where majority–minority relations are in conflict; and scholars of equality law, asserting that any real advancement is blocked because of the individualist orientation of the law, send us back to collective measures.

Within liberal societies, citizens endorse a range of religious, moral, and philosophical views (e.g., Buddhism and utilitarianism). Despite this doctrinal diversity, John Rawls’ account of political liberalism holds that there is a form of democratic equality that is realizable by all citizens. Citizens can be equally politically autonomous if they enjoy equal political power and justify the exercise of that power with public reasons. A political liberal education for democratic citizenship would teach students how to participate in political decision-making, and how to use public reasons when helping to decide fundamental political questions. Political liberalism also can accommodate diverse educational options for families, but this accommodation is limited by political liberalism’s concern for the future political autonomy of students. This concern distinguishes the political liberal account from the “convergence” account of public justification. Unlike political liberalism, the convergence account fails to respect adequately the future political autonomy of students.

This chapter covers how the debate over multiculturalism has evolved over the past fifty years (1970–2020). While the twentieth century was marked by fear of minorities, the twenty-first century is marked by growing fears of majorities. The panic hovering over Europe is not concentrated on the political arrangements of the present but on a deep concern for the future of liberalism. This perception of the future turns social and cultural relationships into a zero-sum game. But is there a way out? The chapter ends with a discussion of contemporary majority and minority tensions in liberal societies and offers a common moral ground that allows managing these tensions, reaching a political compromise that is likely to leave both sides dissatisfied, but it is the most one can achieve. Perhaps the most important lesson of the last fifty years of rights-talk, the chapter argues, is that the expansion of the notion of rights offers an inclusive tool of social discourse but cannot offer a receipt for how societies should handle themselves. That remains the role of democratic process and for that they should be cherished and protected.

Chapter 9 proposes a normative and historical evaluation of the book's findings. It first considers how lawyers compare to other ghostwriters of institutional change, suggesting that what distinguishes lawyers is their capacity to wield a mediatory, boundary-blurring agency to seize opportunities for change that may be lost upon actors shackled to single institutional settings. It then addresses the ethics of lawyers’ ghostwriting, submitting that while concealed actions pushing the bounds of the acceptable are often necessary to jump-start institutional change, Euro-lawyering became more normatively problematic as it corporatized and stratified access to transnational justice. Finally, the chapter concludes by taking stock in light of the contemporary challenges plaguing the rule of law in Europe. As a wave of illiberalism and constitutional breakdowns has swept some EU member states, Euro-lawyers have gained a new raison d’être in the struggle to reclaim the elusive liberal promise of the judicial construction of Europe.

The chapter claims that Political Liberalism (PL) is unsuitable to the Israeli situation. PL envisions a liberal constitutional structure that protects the rights of free and equal citizens and serves as an ideational basis for a reasonable overlapping consensus. My internal critique of PL is that its loose definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, together with the ideas of overlapping consensus, impartiality and public reason, curtail PL’s ability to maintain a liberal constitutional structure that adequately protects rights. Essentially, PL’s reliance on the willingness of illiberal groups to embrace it renders it ineffective where such groups wield a more than negligible political power. Israel is such a setting. A second reason for PL’s unsuitability for Israel is that Israel’s constitutional structure includes fundamental deviations from liberal constitutional principles, both in the area of religion–state relations and in the area of ethnic (Jewish–Arab) relations. Consequently, application of PL in Israel must be preceded by a fundamental change in Israel’s constitutional structure. Otherwise the application of a form of PL adjusted to its current constitutional structure would result in the continued violation of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and of women, and lead to the instability of Israeli democracy.