The first part of the chapter analyses the disparity of the forces involved and Wolseley’s calculations once the intervention in Egypt had begun. It traces the manoeuvres of the belligerents, concluding with the Battle of Tel el-Kebir. The relative importance of British and Egyptian technology, cohesion, and command coherence is assessed. The Sudan campaign followed two distinct phases. The first was an attempt to restore Egyptian authority over its colony, and the ongoing resistance from the proclamation of Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah as ‘Mahdi’ in 1881. The disaster of General Hick’s mission offers the opportunity to analyze the belligerents and their strategic designs, tactics, arms, and early manoeuvres. The second phase of the campaign was the attempted evacuation of Khartoum, and its fall in 1885 despite the relief efforts of Wolseley and his Anglo-Egyptian force. Despite the Victorian apotheosis of Gordon, the garrison commander, the focus here is the operational one, especially the evolution of Wolseley’s more scientific approach to campaigning. There are fascinating episodes, such as the Battle of Abu Klea, that challenge the technological-determinist arguments that are used to explain British military success.

The outbreak of the war in the Sudan was not prompted by vengeance or propaganda as some have argued but by the desire of the Salisbury government to meet Italy’s strategic wishes and relieve pressure on its beleaguered garrison at Kassala. The relatively small Anglo-Egyptian army of 1896 more than doubled to 23,000 by 1898 (with only 8,000 British soldiers) but even this was dwarfed by the Khalifa’s army in excess of 50,000 with riflemen, gunners, and cavalry. The aims of the British commander, Kitchener, were initially limited to striking a blow in the most northerly province of Dongola. Later Kitchener widened his goals to prevent any Mahdist attempts to expand their interests. The Battle of Omdurman, 2 September 1898, proved to be the decisive engagement of the war. Unlike in other battles of the war, where Anglo-Egyptian forces went on the offensive because the Sudanese were unwilling to give up defensive advantages, the Sudanese ruler, the Khalifa, allowed Kitchener to deploy his forces in line formation with artillery support and attacked in broad daylight. The result was a decisive British victory. The Anglo-Sudanese War employed modern technology, the railway, heavily-armed gun-boats, machine guns, and dum dum bullets, which contributed to Kitchener’s triumph.