Over the course of 2020, QAnon has repeatedly captured the news media’s attention more than ever as the group starts to move their activities from online chat boards into the offline world. With increased public attention, so too political commentators (expert and lay) increasingly refer to QAnon as a “cult” (Blazakis, 2021; Hassan, 2021). What is missing in the growing literature on QAnon is: (1) an examination of the movement within the context of the substantial academic literature on new religious movements and (2) use of this research to see whether labeling QAnon a “cult” or “new religious movement” makes sense in a comparative context. This is of particular importance not only because the use of these terms by the public is usually divorced from academic research on the topic, but also because the terms are often used as weapons to tarnish a movement that is considered to be deviant in some way. We argue that QAnon indeed has elements of a new religious movement, and note that treating it as such reveals insights for how the movement will evolve and develop over time.

Drawing on the themes of the previous chapters, this chapter considers the future of QAnon. It examines evidence of new and ongoing developments in the QAnon movement following the electoral loss of President Trump. QAnon has shown a particular ability to re-invent itself in the face of failed predictions, “frame bridging” or brokering ties with existing social networks and movements including lifestyle and wellness communities, anti-vaxxers, deep state conspiracists, radical religious right factions, Patriot and militia movement actors, and other conspiracy-minded groups. As such, QAnon has evolved and become a movement with a life of its own, independent of Trump. While Trump embraced conspiracy theories promulgated by QAnon such as the existence of a “deep state” intent on sabotaging the president’s policies, the range of conspiratorial ideas expand well beyond his administration. Herein, we explore indications of post-Trump era trajectories of QAnon from a social movement perspective, examining preliminary evidence of movement adaptation and change to shifting political conditions. These conditions include the political pressure exerted on major social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to tamp down on misinformation freely circulated by QAnon followers, the election of Joe Biden and the transition to a new administration in the White House, the emergence of a QAnon religion, and the spreading influence of QAnon abroad, adapted and revised for different political environments.