Drawing on recent jurisprudential literature that emphasizes the role and function performed by obligation, this article examines how the ethical doctrine of informed consent has been implemented in the context of health-care reforms in China. It argues that, while the Chinese incorporation of informed consent has sought to empower patients, the major medical laws and social policies fail to instantiate the obligations. Along with this failure, the Chinese medical laws have also failed to secure the bond of trust between them. This article also points out that a rounded analysis of the implementation of informed consent in China must take into account the obligation and function of the major components of the health-care delivery system other than physicians and hospitals, such as health-care insurance schemes.

For more than 20 years, euthanasia in Belgium and The Netherlands is allowed for unbearable suffering caused by terminal or non-terminal illnesses, including psychiatric disorders. Although euthanasia numbers have been increasing over the years, the percentage of cases involving people with a primary psychiatric diagnosis has remained stable (between 1 and 2%). For these cases, the Belgian and Dutch Euthanasia Laws operate similar due care criteria: a well-considered, repeated, and voluntary request from a legally competent adult; a medical condition without prospect of improvement; constant and unbearable suffering that cannot be alleviated; consultation of two independent physicians, including a psychiatrist; and a posteriori evaluation and control [1–3].

This paper discusses the extent to which conscientious objections to vaccination qualify for protection under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on an examination of the nature of conscience and the ethics of vaccine refusal, it argues that a narrow category of reasons for refusal to be vaccinated can be differentiated from more general ‘vaccine hesitancy’. In relation to conscience objections of this kind, it engages in a systematic analysis of the applicability of the ECHR, both in relation to compulsory vaccination, and so-called ‘vaccine passports’. It concludes that states can – and in some situations must – recognise conscientious objections under the ECHR.

This paper interrogates the depoliticising effects of a seemingly neutral regulatory drive at the heart of the World Health Organization (WHO)'s promotion of traditional medicine. Emerging at WHO in the late 1960s against a political backdrop of decolonisation and pan-Africanism, traditional medicine has continued to be promoted in subsequent decades, culminating in the latest global Traditional Medicine Strategy (2014 to 2023). Yet WHO's promotion and acceptance of traditional medicine have also become increasingly conditional upon its standardisation and regulation – something that appears fundamentally at odds with traditional medicine's heterogeneity. Drawing on insights from critical law and science and technology studies, we suggest that such a process at WHO has done more than simply disqualify the toxic and the dangerous. Rather, it has implicitly and explicitly marginalised and excluded those aspects of traditional medicine that deviate from scientific, biomedical ways of seeing, knowing and organising.

Mistakes in assisted human reproduction procedures such as IVF, egg, sperm and embryo donation are surprisingly common, but tortious liability for such mistakes has not been addressed in the courts of England and Wales, or Ireland. This paper presents an argument in favour of a vindicatory approach to tortious claims arising from mistakes, where the claimants are the parents of the resulting, healthy, child. Drawing on the analogous tort of wrongful pregnancy, the paper provides a vindicatory account of the case of Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital, and argues that Rees signposts the correct approach for tortious claims arising from mistakes in assisted human reproduction. It is argued that while the law should not compensate ‘loss’ flowing from the birth of a child, parents should be entitled to an award of damages to vindicate their right to reproductive autonomy. The paper explores vindication of the right to reproductive autonomy through the tort of negligence, but argues that vindication may be more effectively achieved through the creation of a separate tort which is actionable per se, strict liability, and expressly focused on vindication rather than compensation.

Patient choice in the context of National Health Service (NHS) reforms in England can refer to the law and policy underpinning patient movement between the NHS and private healthcare sector (in existence since the introduction of the NHS in 1948), as well as recent competition reforms of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No 2) Regulations 2013 and the 2014 Private Healthcare Market Investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). This paper highlights the existence of two discrete, yet related frameworks: the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework based on Department of Health, NHS England and latterly Clinical Commissioning Group policy, and the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework, derived from New Labour choice and competition policies and subsequently enshrined by the 2012 Act reforms. The juxtaposition of these frameworks underscores the symbiotic relationship between the NHS and private healthcare, which raises questions about the fitness for purpose of current policy. It also helps explain why the competition reforms are difficult to implement, and suggests that the knitting together of patient choice and competition may unravel following the 2012 Act reforms and CMA private healthcare market development.

Genetic information is relevant not only to the patient, but also to their family. Where a patient refuses to share that information with family members, then their legal rights may conflict. This paper focuses on that conflict between the rights of individuals and the rights of third parties. We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it applies in these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately accommodate the familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the situations in which a healthcare practitioner might owe a third-party family member a tortious duty of care. We conclude that in most cases, there will be no duty owed to third parties, but that in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise.

This article seeks to explain and explore the concept of bodily integrity. The concept is often elided with autonomy in the case law and the academic literature. It argues that bodily integrity is non-reducible to the principle of autonomy. Bodily integrity relates to the integration of the self and the rest of the objective world. A breach of it, therefore, is significantly different to inteference in decisions about your body. This explains why interference with bodily integrity requires justification beyond what will suffice for an interference with autonomy. It also explores how this understanding of bodily integrity assists in understanding disability, gender and separated bodily material.