This chapter highlights the centrality of the rule of law to Khatami’s presidential campaign. It then reviews the policies of the heads of the judiciary in the post-Khomeini era, with the most far-reaching reform initiatives occurring during the tenure of Shahroudi (1999–2009). These included trying to phase out special courts, prohibiting the security services from running their own detention and prison systems, ending the death penalty for minors, ending execution by stoning, strengthening the rights of political prisoners, and reforming the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Many of these were reversed or watered down by Sadegh Larijani, head of the judiciary 2009–2019. Ebrahim Raisi (2019-2021) revived some of Shahroudi’s reforms in sentencing and also inaugurated a concerted effort to fight corruption in the judiciary. The chapter illustrates that the judiciary is not a monolith, and much of the quality of the rule of law stands and falls with its leading administrators and professionals.

The independence of the legal profession suffered immeasurably when the bar associations were dissolved after the 1979 Revolution. They only gradually recuperated and reorganized in the 1990s, being allowed to hold internal elections again in 1997 and regain a degree of political independence. Since the early 2000s, however, hardliners have ensured that regimist lawyers dominate the bars’ boards, with the effect that the human rights work of the bar associations came to a halt. What has undermined the work of the bar associations most, however, is the parallel training and examination mechanisms set up in the judiciary for a different kind of lawyer, so-called Article 187 legal advisors. These do not take a bar exam and also otherwise are not organized by the Bar. They are required to seek renewal of their accreditation from the judiciary every year, thus making them highly dependent on the judiciary’s goodwill.