Most large real-world organizations contain multiple smaller groups, such as working groups within firms. However, can this sort of nested groups be used to alleviate coordination failures in the larger group? We report on a multi-player Stag Hunt experiment wherein we hierarchically structure a large group into mutually exclusive small groups. We offer varying incentive payments if efficient coordination is achieved at a large or small group level. The novelty of our design is that we hold the total payment size constant between treatments. In our nested incentive treatment, we reduce the reward for achieving large-group coordination by a small amount and reallocate the same amount to successful small-group coordination. The results reveal that incentive reallocations privileging small groups facilitate efficient large-group coordination in the nested group structure.

We explore gender attitudes towards competition in the United Arab Emirates—a traditionally patriarchal society which in recent times has adopted numerous policies to empower women and promote their role in the labor force. The experimental treatments vary whether individuals compete in single-sex or mixed-sex groups. In contrast to previous studies, women in our sample are not less willing to compete than men. In fact, once we control for individual performance, Emirati women are more likely to select into competition. Our analysis shows that neither women nor men shy away from competition, and both compete more than what would be optimal in monetary terms as the fraction of men in their group increases. We offer a detailed survey of the literature and discuss possible reasons for the lack of gender differences in our experiment.

We examine a variant of ultimatum bargaining in which principals may delegate their proposal decision to agents hired from a competitive market. Contrary to several prior studies, we find that when principals must use agents, the resulting proposals are significantly higher than when principals make proposals themselves. In reconciling our results with prior findings, we conclude that both the rejection power afforded to responders and the structure of principal-agent contracts can play significant roles in the nature of outcomes under delegated bargaining.

The degree to which legislation on labour relations and other societal institutions creates value and mitigates harm is explored in this article through a framework designed to guide both the authoring and the analysis of objects of such legislation. Creating value and mitigating harm are typically explicit in the objects of public policy and implicit in adjudication, administration and adherence under public policies. Although conceptually distinct, creating value and mitigating harm can be both complementary and detrimental to each other. This article reviews various combinations of legislative objects over more than a century of Australian labour and employment relations policy. The objects examined include the prevention of industrial disputes, the introduction of a social minimum wage, the expansion of enterprise bargaining, expansion or curtailment of tribunal powers by government and other developments. Questions of ‘for whom?’ value is created or harm is mitigated are key. As an inductive study, the article concludes with hypotheses to guide future research, including implications that reach beyond Australia and employment legislation.

Supply chain security presents numerous challenges to governments interested in defending against terrorist threats. While most approaches stress technological solutions, scholars and policy-makers tend to overlook economics, labour market issues, and industrial relations. Applying agency theory from behavioural economics, this article analyses threats to the US supply chain and opportunities for efficient solutions. Using data from a sophisticated web-based survey of owner-operator cost-of-operations, it shows that drayage drivers are among the lowest paid truck drivers and workers in the US. We provide evidence that low pay is associated with both safety and security risk. Low-wage labour and subcontracting present challenges to US and foreign supply-chain security because the market attracts workers who have few other employment options. In this environment, principals and agents currently make inefficient and inequitable contracts because markets do not reflect the complete costs associated with low-probability/high-impact events like cargo theft and transport security.

Human resource management in agriculture and associated risks are under-researched topics. To identify the sources of human resource management risks confronting dairy farms, gain insights into how dairy farmers perceive the impacts of these risks, and identify control strategies, four focus group discussions were held with dairy farm managers. Managers' perceptions served to develop a framework for the analysis of human resource management risks in agriculture and derive recommendations for reducing these risks. Results of this study have been used to tailor educational programs for farmers and suggest strategies for future research.

Historically, managers in livestock production have focused on production management; however, as operations have grown they have spent more time managing employees. Increased time spent overseeing employees brings additional risks and challenges, and, hence, a greater need for human resource management (HRM) skills. This study investigated HRM practices in pork production and analyzed their risk attributes through six focus group discussions with managers. Results were compared to existing data from four dairy focus groups and to other research. The results have been used to develop and adapt educational workshops for managers in pork production.

This paper revisits a literature on the links between unionisation and performance-related pay (PRP), which offers a disparate set of results. Part of the reason for this is the usual inability to distinguish between different types of PRP and the lack of rich panel data containing such measures. Analysis of panel data containing six separate PRP schemes reveals that union members are less likely to receive PRP in general and less likely to receive bonus payments, stock options, or profit sharing than non-members. Furthermore, profit sharing is negatively related to both union membership and coverage. However, union members or those covered by a union contract are more likely to be paid piece rates, providing further evidence that piece-rate pay differs from other forms of PRP.

We address basic questions about performance-related pay in the US. How widespread is it? What characteristics of employers and jobs are associated with it? What are recent trends in its incidence? What factors are responsible for these trends? Nearly two-fifths of hours worked in the US economy in 2013 were in jobs with performance-related pay, but this share has been declining. We consider several possible causes for this trend and find that they do not have much explanatory power. We do establish, however, that any potential explanation must also account for a long-term shift in the relative incidence of performance-related pay away from low-wage and toward high-wage jobs.

A l'heure de l'économie du savoir et de la connaissance, l'éducation est devenue un enjeu majeur et l'enseignant a acquis une place centrale dans le processus de production d'éducation. Dans ces conditions, sont recherchés les moyens d'augmenter la performance des enseignants afin d'améliorer les résultats scolaires des élèves. La mise en place de structures incitatives (notamment la rémunération à la performance) est souvent suggérée mais les études démontrant l'efficacité des incitations restent mitigées.

Cet article propose une revue de la littérature théorique et empirique sur la façon dont les incitations affectent le comportement des enseignants. Les arguments pour et contre la mise en incitation des enseignants sont étu-diés. En particulier, nous examinons i) les difficultés à contrôler et à évaluer la performance des enseignants, ii) la question du travail en équipe dans un contexte d'individualisation de la performance et iii) le problème du multitâches lorsque les incitations portent sur seulement quelques tâches.