Control over the legislative messaging agenda has important political, electoral and policy consequences. Existing models of congressional agenda-setting suggest that national polarization drives the agenda. At the same time, models of home style and formal models of leadership hypothesize that legislators shift their messaging as they balance coordination and information problems. We say the coordination problem dominates when conditions incentivize legislators to agree on the same message rather than fail to reach consensus. Conversely, the information problem is said to dominate in circumstances where legislators prefer to say nothing at all rather than reach consensus on the wrong political message. Formal theories predict that when coordination problems are pressing, legislative members follow the policy positions of party leaders. When their party’s information problem is acute, party members instead rely on the wisdom of the caucus to set the party’s agenda. To test these theories, we analyze the Twitter accounts of U.S. House members with a Joint Sentiment Topic model, generating a new understanding of House leadership power. Our analyses reveal complex leader-follower relationships. Party leaders possess the power to substantially affect the propensity of rank-and-file members to discuss topics, especially when the coordination problem dominates; these effects are pronounced even when coordination problems are pressing. That said, when the underlying politics are unclear, rank-and-file members exert influence on the discussion of a topic because the information problem is more acute. At the same time and for these uncertain topics, leadership influence decreases, consistent with theory. We show these results are robust to the underlying dynamics of contemporary political discussion and context, including leading explanations for party leadership power, such as national polarization.