A growing strand of literature relates pro-market institutions to business and overall employment creation. However, the effects of pro-market institutions on industry-specific employment creation still need to be better understood. Employment creation in some industries may be more sensitive to pro-market institutions. Moreover, if these industries employ a large proportion of the population, the role of local-level institutions becomes more critical for boosting employment creation across industries. Therefore, we disentangle the effects of local-level pro-market institutions on employment creation across nine major industries by using 5-year balanced panel data of 374 US metropolitan areas from 1972 to 2017. Our fixed-effects results indicate that pro-market institutions boost employment creation only in the manufacturing, retail, and construction sectors. Furthermore, our findings reveal that local public policies can benefit or harm local employment creation, depending on the concentration of industries in the area.

This article assesses the historical political economy of the Australian automotive industry alongside the paradigmatic policy shift in economic policy away from protection towards neoliberalism and globalisation. It focuses on the politics of policy change and government assistance, providing a detailed historical narrative of the development and decline of the Australian automotive industry. From the mid-1980s to the mid-2010s, policy-makers oversaw the decline and fall of the Australian automotive industry. The process of decline occurred within a long-term cycle of new assistance, declining protection, new investment, inadequate restructuring, weak profitability, declining market share, and new assistance. Each cycle, however, was unable to stave off renewed crisis and eventual demise. Over the same period, Australian policy-makers transformed the economy from one of the most protectionist in the developed world to one of the most open. The article outlines the impact of neoliberalism on the automotive industry and analyses what the decline of the industry tells us about how the neoliberal policy structure operates in the ‘actually existing’ political economy. It argues that while the burgeoning neoliberal policy structure in the 1980s and 1990s acted to restrict the range of policy choices available for restructuring the industry, the domestic politics of industry assistance acted to restrict the neoliberal colonisation of the policy agenda. Neoliberal governance has had to contend with political imperatives for continuing assistance, while, at the same time, those political imperatives have been increasingly shaped by neoliberalism.

Australia has one of the most ‘liberalised’ electricity sectors in the world. The sale of government-owned electricity companies has contributed to that liberalisation and a quarter of the proceeds of one of the world’s largest privatisation programmes. In 2014, the state governments of New South Wales and Queensland announced further electricity privatisations if re-elected. Advocates claim private ownership will mean more productive investment, lower costs leading to more efficient operations, lower prices for all consumers and better market functioning without government interference. Opponents contend that the true value of government businesses is not being realised at sale, retention can achieve returns greater than those from a sale, and that follow sale, prices will rise and jobs will be lost. This article demonstrates that the claims of either lower or higher prices, of job losses and of more efficient operations are tantamount to being myths of privatisation not borne out by reality.

This article critically analyses the opportunities for Australia to revitalise its strategically important manufacturing sector in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. It considers Australia’s industry policy options on the basis of both advances in the theory of industrial policy and recent policy proposals in the Australian context. It draws on recent work from The Australia Institute’s Centre for Future Work examining the prospects for Australian manufacturing renewal in a post-COVID-19 economy, together with other recent work in political economy, economic geography and labour process theory critically evaluating the Fourth Industrial Revolution (i4.0) and its implications for the Australian economy. The aim of the article is to contribute to and further develop the debate about the future of government intervention in manufacturing and industry policy in Australia. Crucially, the argument links the future development of Australian manufacturing with a focus on renewable energy.

Changes to the Australian regulatory landscape over the past three decades of global liberalisation created regulatory uncertainty for unions. Coupled with membership decline and internal restructuring through union amalgamations, they prompted an important reorientation by unions (back) to the workplace, and precipitated different strategic decisions and organising challenges. However, the proliferation of fragmented employment relationships rendered workplace-centred organising an insufficient response. As a result, some unions experimented with ways of supplementing existing legal frameworks by other regulatory initiatives, through campaigns that resulted in the layering of regulation. In this article, we examine attempts by three unions – covering garment workers, road transport workers and aged care workers – to address the needs of members in garment homeworking, road transport and aged care in a contested regulatory environment.

This paper tests the hypothesis pertaining to the interdependencies between trade and environmental policies in the presence of industry/firm lobbies, which is captured through industry/firm size. For an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms in India at the five-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC), 2008 for the period 2008–2019, I find that firm size has a positive and significant impact on trade policy. The same holds true for a subset of firms that are polluting in nature (based on the Central Pollution Control Board classification). It is found that larger firms have a greater influence on those trade policies that are set unilaterally by the government. Also, there is no empirical support in favour of trade and environment linkages in the Indian context. This could be due to the fact that these two policies come under the domain of independent ministries of the government. Moreover, environmental safety assumes less significance and tends to adversely affect the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Notwithstanding the fact that environmental regulations are in place, the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are remarkably weak on account of weak environmental institutions.

This paper uses economic history to probe the relationship between state capacity and economic growth during the Great and Little Divergences (c.1500–c.1850). It identifies flaws in the dominant measure of state capacity, fiscal capacity, and advocates instead analysing state expenditures. It investigates five key activities on which states historically spent resources: waging war; providing law and administration; building infrastructure; pursuing industrial policy; and fostering a national culture. The lesson of history, it concludes, is not to build a capacious state. Rather, we need a state that uses its capacity to help (or at least not hinder) market activity.

All law is relatively coarse after its initial implementation as the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies that can arise in the actual application of the law. Therefore, decisions need to be made by street-level administrators as novel and particular circumstances arise. Economists have largely ignored the political science literature on street-level bureaucrats, such as policemen, welfare case managers, or regulatory agents. I present a case study in the context of market entry regulation in Germany. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that bureaucratic discretion exists, that is, administrative actions can be found on different ends of a decision space, and that its effects are potentially large. Administrators do not apply legislation in a uniform manner and we observe a systematically different application of rules across subnational jurisdictions.